

FINAL REPORT

PARTICIPATORY EVALUATION OF THE COUNTERPART CONSORTIUM COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

Project # 115-0001, Central Asian Republics

Prepared for:

The United States Agency for International Development
Regional Mission for Central Asia
Almaty, Kazakstan

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FINAL REPORT

DECEMBER 30, 1996

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PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

1. Country: Central Asian Republics
2. Project Title: CENTRAL ASIA NGO SUPPORT INITIATIVE
3. Project Number: 115-0001
4. Project Dates: September 28, 1994 to June 30, 1997
5. Project Funding: A.I.D. Grant: \$5,519,000
Non-Federal Contribution: \$1,243,000
\$6,762,000
6. Mode of Implementation: Cooperative Agreement with Counterpart Foundation, Inc.
7. Project Designers: USAID's Regional Mission for Central Asia in Almaty
8. Responsible Mission Officials:
 - a. Mission Directors: Craig Buck, 1994-1995
Patti Buckles, 1995-present
 - b. Project Officers: Paula Feeley, COTR 1994-95
Marilynn Schmidt, COTR 1995-present
Office of Social Transition, USAID/CAR
9. Previous Evaluations: None

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACDI	Agricultural Credit Development International
ATA	Aid to Artisans
CAR	Central Asia Republics
CIS	Central Independent States
CNFA	Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs
DIA	Dutch Interchurch Aid
HELVETAS	Swiss International Aid Group
HIVOS	Dutch Development Aid Group
GII	Goodwill Industries, International
GTZ	German Aid Agency
INTRAC	International NGO Training and Research Centre
IREX	International Research and Exchange Board
NET	NGO Educational Training
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIS	Newly Independent States
PCV	Peace Corps Volunteer
PFA	Private Farmer Association
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
SOROS	Private Educational Foundation
TACIS	Technical Assistance for Central Independent States (European Union)
TASIF	Tajikistan Social Investment Fund
TOT	Training of Trainers
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
VOCA	Volunteers Overseas Cooperating in Agriculture

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of the Central Asian Republics' Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Support Activity is to help citizens of the five countries of Central Asia to more effectively participate in the political and economic life of their countries. In order to strengthen the capacity of indigenous NGOs, USAID signed a "Cooperative Agreement" in September of 1994 with Counterpart Foundation, Inc., who in turn signed subagreements with its PVO partners in the Consortium. The three partners are Aid to Artisans, the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs, and Goodwill Industries, International. The two major components of the projects are: *1) to identify and organize a broad array of local NGOs, irrespective of area focus, and provide them with generic and practical training, technical assistance and small seed-grants; and 2) to provide more intensive support to indigenous NGOs through U.S./Central Asia Partnerships in three areas of critical importance to democratic, social and economic development in Central Asia..* The smaller third component is designed to stimulate corporate giving to NGOs in Central Asia by setting-up a pilot matching grant effort. These three components remain valid in supporting USAID's new strategic objectives for Central Asia.

The Counterpart Consortium has been operating for almost two years with seven months remaining in the present Cooperative Agreement until June 30, 1997. Active offices are operating in Almaty, Bishkek, and Tashkent with a newly formed office recently opened in Dushanbe. All the offices have a core of three trainers who both provide training and technical assistance to NGOs in their countries. The number of NGOs that are involved in the program has exceeded the number in the original program design. 1,271 NGOs have benefited from training including 200 that have also received a combination of technical assistance and a seed grant and/or partnership grant. The following program objectives might be emphasized in the future in focussing on strengthening NGOs capacity to affect government laws and policies in order for the NGOs to better provide financially sustainable social and human services:

- a. Increase the capacity of the NGO sector to affect fiscal policies of the various governments in promoting laws and policies that foster their development and growth.
- b. Focus on increasing the capacity of NGOs to provide financially sustainable human services not provided by the public sector.
- c. Promote a regional database of NGOs by increasing the availability of information through the electronic media while addressing democratic processes, social and human issues.

The management system has been effective through a strong, dynamic management team working through USAID's Office of Social Transition in Almaty, the country offices, and the Counterpart Consortium team located in four countries with circuit riders covering all the countries. The Consortium has successfully built upon successes and lessons learned of USAID and other support programs in the NIS. Russian trainers have been an integral part of the program as trainers of trainers and provide materials from their successful support programs in Russia. The Consortium

members have worked well with other USAID grantees and projects as well as the other donors such as TACIS, UNDP, UNHCR, SOROS, and the Peace Corps.

Staffing of the Counterpart Consortium was modified with USAID concurrence within the first quarter of project start-up. As originally designed in the RFA, there were to have been only two expatriates, (the Regional Director and the Financial Manager) with local hires as the Country Directors for Krygyzstan and Uzbekistan. Once on the ground, Counterpart reassessed the situation with USAID and recommended that they have expatriate country directors for the satellite offices, using expatriates already on the ground working in the NGO sector. This decision enabled Counterpart to modify the design further by using the Country Director in Krygyzstan as the Regional Training Director since he was the former Peace Corps Training Director in that country. With the addition of Tajikistan (in February 1996), the senior team grew to five expatriate staff located in four of the five Central Asian Republics. This team is supplemented by 12 local trainers (3 each located in Almaty, Bishkek, Tashkent, and Dushanbe) and two expatriate interns serving in Tashkent and Almaty as NGO grant monitors and evaluators but traveling as circuit riders to all four countries.

The project design, as modified in the present staffing structure, is an effective use of the limited personnel covering four countries. It is extremely cost effective in providing training, technical assistance, and seed grants to more than double the original number of NGOs envisioned in the original project design. The Consortium model with a lead PVO and 3 sub-agreements has supported the overall efforts in strengthening the NGO sector in four countries. Each partner has received support from the lead PVO including Goodwill Industries International which was in the unique position of founding its own NGO (Goodwill Initsiativa) in Tashkent which became registered, established its own bank account and began its store operation.

The model has been flexible in its design in supporting about 15 different sectors through its seed grant program and partnership grants. The regional nature of the program across four countries has stretched the human resources at times. The seven expatriate staff are often traveling between Almaty and other countries but that hasn't negatively affected their performance. With e-mail now installed in all countries, communication has vastly improved. The circuit rider aspect of the job for ATA and CNFA may have prevented them from providing equal effort in all three countries. There is a strong need for additional staff for ATA to adequately foster its 9 NGO partners and to expand into Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The same is true for CNFA if they are to expand into Tajikistan.

Joint programming and the formation of partnerships has been on-going with both other U.S. grantees/institutions and international groups such as UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, GTZ, HIVOS, EU-TACIS, the World Bank, INTRAC and World Learning. In Krygyzstan, leveraging other donor resources, (the World Bank, UNHCR and HELVETAS) has enabled Counterpart to establish satellite offices in the more remote rural areas of Naryn, Kara-Balta, and in Jalal-Abad. In addition, EU-TACIS funding has enabled Counterpart to establish a NGO Resource Center in Bishkek with a satellite center in Osh in partnership with a local NGO support organization (Interbilim) and two European partners (Christian Aid and Dutch InterChurch Aid). The Counterpart Country Director also sits on the USIS-managed Democracy Commission which oversees a grant program for local

NGOs and others promoting civil society. In Tajikistan, Counterpart has partnered with Save the Children to provide NGO training as well as to cost share operational expenses.

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION CONCLUSIONS:

1. The Counterpart Consortium is leveraging many of its activities with other donors and other grantees/contractors. The communication network is working well and there isn't any apparent duplication of effort. The synergy derived from collaborations are the rule which should auger well for Sustainability.
2. The Consortium has not targeted a defined recipient audience but has promoted an open invitation to participate in its programs. Fifteen sectors have been categorized on the Counterpart Consortium NGO Database with 1302 NGOs registered. The number of grants and training provided to NGOs closely reflects the profile on the database.
3. The Counterpart broad-based training program is providing relevant and focused modules in four areas: NGOs & Community, Strategic Planning, NGO Management & Project Design, and NGOs & the Media. These workshops are provided in four countries with only Turkmenistan lacking a venue. Contractor NGOs have been trained by Counterpart to conduct the most basic module on NGOs and the community which is helping to institutionalize training capacity in the region and enable Counterpart's staff trainers to focus on more complex modules.
4. The impact of the Consortium's grant program on the development of the NGO community can't be separated from the impact of the training program since they both go hand-to-hand. Grants are not given without training and follow-up.
5. The three types of grants all serve a unique purpose in serving the objectives of the project. The Partnership Grants (15) are probably the most important as far as serving to establish a sustainable link with a U.S. organization. The Seed Grants (163) serve a vital role in often getting the NGO established on a firm footing. The Challenge Grants instill philanthropic attitudes and foster local partnering with corporations who may continue their joint sponsorship of activities within those NGOs.
6. Without adequate NGO laws and policies that promote their development and financial sustainability, the network of NGOs in the Central Asian Republics will be hindered in their missions. In most countries, NGO legislation is waiting to be acted upon by the various governments. This project is fostering the "bottom-up" approach with NGO membership being a critical factor in gaining political influence in order to promote social and economic policies that will promote NGOs. USAID has completed its American Legal Consortium project but Counterpart is continuing to support the "*Working Group on Legal Reform*" in Uzbekistan, the "*Forum of NGOs*" in Krygyzstan and consumer rights and human rights organizations in all targeted countries. As an outgrowth of the regional conference on "*NGOs and the Law*" sponsored by Counterpart and ALC in 1995, NGO coalitions have

formed in all three countries to work on legal reform and promotion of the NGO sector.

7. Timing of any program intervention is important. The program has only been operational less than two years and in Tajikistan began only this year. In order for the intended impact to occur, more time will be needed to bring those organizations into the next stage of maturity. Training and a support system of technical assistance in more specialized areas will be needed during the next stage.
8. The Counterpart Consortium's role has been and will continue to provide the skills necessary for NGO growth and development. It is the job of the NGO itself to adapt those skills to the Central Asian environment. Financial support is necessary as a catalyst. However, it is the training, continued technical support, and successful projects that will make a sustainable organization.

OVERALL CONSORTIUM RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Encourage the network of NGOs to improve their communication and information-sharing network. Work more intensively on the education through the media type workshops to education both the public and the governments of the five Central Asian Republics on the advantages of promoting this "*Third Sector*". Continue to improve and expand the NGO Database among all five countries and assist in the linking-up of the various NGO Resources Centers with e-mail and Internet connections.
2. Concentrate on the "practical" and "high payoff" development of partnerships between indigenous and U.S. NGOs. The country offices and the U.S. partners should be encouraged to work directly with the existing 15 partnerships in developing a dynamic relationship.
3. Expand the training program into new modules and into more remote areas of Central Asia. Develop further the ability of local training sub-contractors to deliver more of the basic training modules while allowing the Counterpart Consortium Trainers to expand their efforts into both new modules and into the rural blasts outside the capital cities. Continue to use training consultants from Russia to develop the new training modules with the Counterpart Trainers.
4. Continue to provide technical and financial advice to the NGO community in leveraging outside resources. More effort should be spent in opening *NGO Resource Centers* in the Tashkent, Almaty, and Dushanbe offices.
5. Develop an integrated "*Package of Services*" for all five Central Asian Republics that includes training, consultants, small grants, access to corporate support, partnership development, database development, and information-sharing.
6. Encourage the Counterpart Consortium's offices and satellite offices to provide services that will sustain themselves as the project eventually phases-out. The most critical element in this

successful transition into sustainable local NGOs is to develop leadership capacity among the local staff. Fostering leadership development should be a deliberate part of any follow-on program.

ACTION PLAN UNTIL JUNE 30, 1997:

Continue with the present work plans for the Counterpart Consortium partners until USAID makes a decision on the possible extension of the project past June 30, 1997.

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|-----------------------|---|
| Dec. 1996 | Design possible program options for future USAID funding. |
| Jan-March '97 | USAID makes a decision on the extension or phase-out. |
| March-June '97 | Either designing program for the extension with staffing commitments in the various offices OR implementing a phase-out plan with both professional and support staff searching for new jobs. |

OPTIONS FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE PROJECT:

This project has only been operational for less than two years and all indications are that it is on track and has exceeded its targets in most of the areas. With one exception, the consortium partners have performed as expected within the time frame of the project. The project is well managed and has produced results within a very short time frame. The various options for an extension seem to be as follows:

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|------------------|---|
| Option #1 | Continue the project with increased support in various NGO sectors; |
| Option #2 | Continue the project with decreased financial support from USAID; |
| Option #3 | Close-out the project on schedule |

I. INTRODUCTION

Background:

USAID/CAR is a regional Mission supporting USAID projects in five Central Asia Republics: Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Each country is on its own path towards democratic transition. The USAID's projects in the different countries tries to be reflective of those regional differences, while supporting citizens' rights region-wide. A variety of contractors work in the region in partnership with local NGOs. Counterpart, with its three PVO partners, is one among them. There are also housing associations, agricultural groups, NGOs supported through the American Law Center, health care workers, and environmental NGO groups.

The Central Asian Democracies are in many ways less developed than those in Russia and Eastern Europe. This has enabled programs in the Central Asian Republics to benefit from the experiences learned in those countries. The NGO Support Project was an outgrowth of that learning. It was designed to include three elements: grant programs, partnership programs, and the critical element of a training program to develop NGOs as sustainable institutions.

Purpose of the Evaluation:

The USAID Regional Mission for Central Asia wanted a participatory evaluation done of the Counterpart Consortium Cooperative Agreement in order to focus program modifications for the final period of the Cooperative Agreement and to identify areas for follow-on work in support of the development of Non-Government Organizations in the region. The specific purpose was to assess the current status of the NGO Support Activity, identify and analyze problems, and make recommendations for improving project implementation, and follow-on work as appropriate.

II. SCOPE OF WORK and METHODOLOGY

The participatory evaluation team identified problems and constraints to the successful achievement of the project. It also analyzed these constraints and formulated conclusions and recommendations. The focus of the evaluation intended to look at possible program modifications for the final period of the Cooperative Agreement until June 30, 1997 and to identify areas for follow-on work in support of the sustainable development of NGOs in the Central Asian region.

The participants in the evaluation included the partners, the customers and the stakeholders in the USAID/CAR's NGO Support Initiative for Central Asia. The partners are both U.S.-based and those in Central Asia. They included USAID's ENI/DG in Washington and in Almaty as well as the country representatives in Bishkek, Tashkent, and Dushanbe. Counterpart and its consortium partners: Aid-to-Artisans (Crafts-based Micro enterprise Development), Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs (The Rural Sector), and Goodwill Industries International (Social Services) were interviewed in their home offices in the United States and in their field offices in the Central Asian Republics. The customers were the NGOs who were contacted and visited either in focus groups or directly at their offices/locations of operations. Finally, the stakeholders or members of the NGOs were contacted during meetings at various locations.

The methodology used was jointly agreed upon between the Evaluation Team and the USAID/CAR in Almaty and ENI/DG in Washington during the Team Planning Meeting prior to the field work. Background documents including the monthly and quarterly reports were reviewed as well as the

strategic Framework documents for USAID/CAR. Interviews were conducted with each of the Consortium Partners in the Washington D.C. area and over the telephone with Aid-to-Artisans in Connecticut.

The field work covered three weeks including the writing of the preliminary draft report and a debriefing with USAID/CAR in Almaty. Visits to the three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan were completed including interviews with the USAID country directors and the USAID/CAR staff in the Office of Social Transition and Strategic Objective team members. Focus group meetings with NGOs and staff members of the partners were undertaken in all three countries. Informant interviews with NGOs and other donors in these countries were also completed with the assistance of all the Consortium partners and USAID/CAR.

Upon completion of the field work, a second team planning meeting was held in Almaty with the Consortium partners and all their expatriate staff including USAID/CAR staff from the Office of Social Transition. The findings were synthesized and conclusions were discussed as well as possible future strategies for sustaining the NGO Support Initiative. Six major areas deemed most critical to the successful achievement of the cooperative agreement were studied: 1) Project Design, 2) Project Objectives, 3) Operational Systems and Management, 4) Project Implementation, 5) Project Self-Evaluation, and 6) Sustainability.

III. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. VALIDITY OF PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

The purpose of the Central Asian Republics' Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Support Activity, according to the Cooperative Agreement, "*is to help citizens of Central Asia more actively and effectively participate in the political and economic life of their countries.*" There are two major components and a smaller third component, all of which seek to strengthen the capacity of indigenous NGOs in Central Asia."

1. FINDINGS:

Component 1: Identify and organize, in both rural and urban areas, a broad array of local NGOs, irrespective of area focus, and provide them with generic and practical training, technical assistance and small seed-grants.

The Mission's Strategic Objectives (2.1 "Increased , better-informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making" and 3.2 "Improved sustainability of social benefits and services related to health, housing and needs of selected vulnerable groups") are being met as the number of advocacy NGOs increases and their membership strengthens in both providing social services and engaging the government and media in resolving the problems of civil society.

Component 2: Provide more intensive support to indigenous NGOs through U.S./Central-Asia Partnerships in three areas of critical importance to democratic, social and economic development in Central Asia.

Both of the Mission's Strategic Objectives (2.1 and 3.2) are partially being met by the partnership arrangements of U.S. and Central Asian NGOs. As these NGO partnerships become institutionalized, a small number of indigenous NGOs will be having a sustained effect on influencing government policy in the agricultural and artisan sectors as well as providing training and employment for the more vulnerable social groups such as the physically and mentally handicapped.

Component 3: Stimulate corporate giving to NGOs in Central Asia by setting-up a pilot matching grant effort.

This component could have set an example of civic responsibility for indigenous corporations in supporting local activities that benefit the more vulnerable groups (SO 3.2) but hasn't yet had a major effect on SO 2.1. Most of the corporate challenge grants have been provided by local corporations and a few by international affiliated firms. However, this element of the project has not yet reached its potential since there isn't any enabling legislation encouraging this type of philanthropy.

2. CONCLUSIONS

The three components of the program remain valid in supporting USAID's new strategic objectives for Central Asia. The initial objectives laid out in the sub-agreements between Counterpart Foundation, Inc. and the three partners (Aid to Artisans, The Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs, and Goodwill Industries International) were to provide U.S. models of service delivery and management in sectors vital to the community-based economic growth and maintenance of a social safety net for vulnerable groups in the population: unemployed, women, elderly, youth, people with disabilities and special needs. U.S. PVOs have partnered with indigenous NGOs to strengthen the local partners' management capability, service/program delivery, and institutional viability. They are:

AID TO ARTISANS:

According to the Subagreement between Counterpart Foundation, Inc. and Aid to Artisans, the ATA project has the following basic objectives:

1. *Institutional strengthening of craft-producing and social service NGOs through the creation of crafts-based commercial enterprises.*
2. *Institutional strengthening of craft-producing and social service NGOs through training and real-life practical experience in business skills--product development and design, production, marketing, pricing, simple accounting, office procedures (e.g. filing, phone logs, activity reports, etc).*
3. *Institutional strengthening of rural NGOs through craft-related Micro enterprise, such as small-scale post-harvest food and textile production, and production of household items and garments.*
4. *Facilitation of networking among crafts-producing NGOs through trade; local, regional and export markets; procurement of raw materials; training workshops, and crafts fairs.*

5. *Creation of supplemental income for women NGO leaders and members.*

Their five basic objectives remain valid in creating financially sustainable NGOs in Central Asia through crafts-based Micro enterprise development. They conform to USAID's strategic objectives 2.1 by increasing citizens' participation in economic decision-making by improving the laws and policies which will enable the craft-based NGOs to operate in a financially sustainable manner.

THE CITIZENS NETWORK FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS:

The Subagreement between Counterpart Foundation, Inc. and the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs has the following five basic objectives:

1. *To support the development of new private farmers' associations as democratic, rural-based NGOs in Central Asia through partnerships with state Farm Bureaus from the U.S.;*
2. *To support the development of other rural NGOs including trade associations and commodity groups, by creating partnerships with American counterpart NGOs;*
3. *To stimulate and accelerate U.S. corporate support to Central Asian NGOs by supporting the successful development and implementation of joint ventures between U.S. farm, food and agribusiness enterprises and emerging private counterparts in Central Asia;*
4. *To develop institutional capability and management skills in running rural NGOs--farm associations, cooperatives, trade associations, commodity groups, and enterprises--through training, technical assistance, exchanges, and other efforts designed to develop organizations, human resources and create strong partnerships between American and Central Asian NGOs;*
5. *To provide Central Asian women farmers, manager, entrepreneurs, and leaders with the information, training, and tools they need to participate successfully at all levels in a private free-market economy and a democratic society by encouraging long-term business and personal linkages between Central Asian women farmers, managers, entrepreneurs, and leaders and their American counterparts.*

Four of the five basic objectives remain valid in creating democratic and pluralistic participation, promoting the economic viability of rural communities and raising the quality of life for the people of rural Central Asia. The third objective of stimulating U.S. corporate support to Central Asian NGOs by supporting the development and implementation of joint ventures between U.S. farm, food and agribusiness enterprises and emerging private counterparts in Central Asia does not appear to fit into USAID's strategic objectives 2.1 or 3.2. The partnership programs between private farmer associations and three different state. Farm Bureaus as a model conforms to USAID's strategic objective 2.1 (Increased, Better-Informed Citizens' Participation in Political and Economic Decision-Making).

GOODWILL INDUSTRIES, INTERNATIONAL

The Subagreement between Counterpart Foundation, Inc. and Goodwill Industries, International has the following seven objectives:

1. *Develop self-sustaining NGOs in Central Asia partnered with U.S. Goodwills in North America;*
2. *Develop small business enterprises in manufacturing, retail and contract work within the local communities;*
3. *Create job training facilities incorporating current rehabilitation techniques for people with disabilities and special needs;*
4. *Establish contracts with the local business community to create reciprocal relationships and job openings for people from the most vulnerable sectors of society;*
5. *Enhance the local economy through the retail and contract services offered;*
6. *Serve as a model for further NGO social service delivery and small business enterprises;*
7. *Develop linkages between the indigenous NGO community and international NGO, small business, and vocational rehabilitation community.*

The objectives of setting-up a Goodwill Industries rehabilitation model on a sustainable basis in Central Asia remain valid. The development of Goodwill Industries International partnerships with indigenous groups and assistance in start-up through training, technical assistance and the establishment of retail stores conforms to USAID's strategic objective 3.2 (Improved Sustainability of Social Benefits and Services).

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

The current program objectives remain valid within the context of the Missions's Strategic Objectives in the areas of democracy and social services support for vulnerable populations. However, the following program objectives might be emphasized in the future in focussing on strengthening NGOs capacity to affect government laws and policies in order for the NGOs to better provide financially sustainable social and human services:

- A. Increase the capacity of the NGO sector to affect fiscal policies of the various governments in promoting laws and policies that foster their development and growth.
- B. Promote a regional database of NGOs by increasing the availability of information through the electronic media while addressing democratic processes and social and human issues.
- C. Focus on increasing the capacity of NGOs to provide financially sustainable human

services not provided by the public sector.

B. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND EFFECTIVENESS

The operational systems and management processes of this NGO Support Activity was authorized by a Cooperative Agreement No. 110-0007-A-00-4020-00 between USAID and Counterpart Consortium signed on September 25, 1994. This activity is under the Civil Society Component of USAID's Democratic Pluralism Project. It has been administered by the Office of Social Transition in USAID's Central Asian Republics' regional Mission in Almaty. The period of performance of the agreement is for about 33 months until June 30, 1997.

1. FINDINGS

The Cooperative Agreement's original budget was \$6.243 million with USAID funding at \$5 million. The amount obligated at signing was \$3 million. Three amendments in 1995 obligated an additional \$1.175 million. Two amendments in December of 1995 and in January of 1996 revised the budget and added Tajikistan and the opening of an office in Dushanbe. Effective August 23, 1996, an additional \$1.344 was obligated through Amendments 6 and 7. This included \$825,000 of the original \$5 million program budget plus an additional \$519,000 of funding. Therefore, the subgrant budget to NGOs was increased by \$353,429 to \$1.274 million in August of 1996. A revised budget for the remaining \$165,571 is still being developed. About 46 percent of the \$5.5 million USAID grant was allocated directly for activities in the following four countries:

Kazakstan:	\$1.088 (43%)
Uzbekistan:	\$0.759 (30%)
Kyrgyzstan:	\$0.525 (21%)
Tajikistan:	\$0.147 (6%)

Total:	\$2.519 million
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- A. The pipeline analysis through September 30, 1996 indicates that about 30 percent of the USAID grant budget remains and 49 percent of the Counterpart Consortium non-federal contribution has not yet been spent. Nine months remained in the project (27 percent) . As of the November Grant Review Meeting, a total of \$1.122 million or 88 percent of the subgrant budget has been granted to about 200 NGOs during 15 grant review meetings
- B. USAID/CAR in Almaty administers the project through the Office of Social Transition. An active management style which keeps abreast of weekly developments with the prime and subgrantees has been effective in implementing the project. However, USAID in the beginning of the project indicated it would not approve a local NGO's association with the U.S. partner, Goodwill Industries International. . Since USAID verbally disapproved of the intended local partner, Goodwill indicated that they were delayed in meeting its goals in implementing its program since they had to begin by setting-up their own organization without a local partner. Presently, USAID/CAR hasn't yet approved the revised work plan for Goodwill Industries International which was proposed by both the Counterpart

Foundation and Goodwill in July of 1996. Budget revisions were also sent to USAID in September which reduced USAID's contribution by \$123,928.

- C. Counterpart Foundation as the lead agency has played an active role in managing the total project both from the U.S. and from within the CAR. The regional centers in Bishkek, Tashkent, and the recently established office in Dushanbe in March have all been in direct communication with the head office in Almaty. Monthly team meetings bring all members of the consortium together in Almaty for both NGO grant reviews and round tables on planning or training issues.
- D. The U.S. linked sub-agreement partners are working in all three countries with the exception of Goodwill Industries International which is working only in Uzbekistan. However, the base for Aid to Artisans is in Tashkent with the majority of time spent in Uzbekistan. Although the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs regional office is in Bishkek, CNFA has striven to equitably distribute its effort and resources among its three targeted oblasts in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. CNFA has focused its efforts in Kyrgyzstan since its PFA partner in Osh is only a year old and functions in a highly democratic fashion which has attracted increased attention from the donor community. Communication is by e-mail, fax and telephone with weekly reports on progress sent to the Counterpart Regional Office in Almaty.
- E. The U.S. based offices are linked to the field offices in direct communication but normally communicate through the prime agency of the consortium in Washington.

2. CONCLUSIONS

- A. There is a strong, dynamic management team of the NGO Support Initiative including all the partners.
- B. USAID/CAR is not providing timely decision-making on issues relating to one of the sub-agreement partners. However, this is not the norm for the other partners who receive feedback in a timely manner.
- C. The reporting from the field offices to the regional office and USAID/CAR is more frequent than originally planned. Information is flowing weekly in some cases to USAID from the field but frequent report production doesn't appear to detract from the work plans of the consortium members.
- D. The roles and responsibilities of USAID, the lead agency, the regional centers, the U.S. linked sub-agreement partners, and the U.S. based offices appear clear with little if any problem with the exception of one of sub-agreement partners.
- E. Independent country offices would not necessarily be able to implement a more effective NGO support program since the regional meetings provide an opportunity for synergy and the sharing of implementation processes and networking among all consortium members.

Even though, the Central Asian Republics have many differences, the similarities and implementation problems among them enhance the network of working NGOs within the region.

- F. USAID feedback to the consortium members has been adequate regarding priorities, budget considerations and observations from monitoring visits.
- G. The program is not missing opportunities to provide assistance as a result of cautious management. In fact, the grant program has progressed much better than anticipated and targets have been greatly exceeded for the seed grants to more than 200 NGOs in less than two years. Management has been “business-like” with only about 70 percent of the loan applications being approved at the grant meetings..
- H. The Consortium has successfully built upon successes and lessons learned of USAID and other support programs in the NIS. Counterpart held a conference in Kiev for NGO networking and World Learning came to Almaty to give a media training conference for NGOs. Furthermore, Russian trainers have been an integral part of the program as trainers of trainers and provide materials from their successful support programs in Russia.
- I. The Consortium members have worked successfully with other USAID grantees and projects as well as with other donors such as EU-TACIS, World Bank, UNDP, UNHCR, Soros, and the Peace Corps..

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. Make USAID approvals on major work plan revisions in a timely manner for all grantees.
- B. Approve a revised Counterpart Consortium budget to subgrantees until the end of June 1997 as soon as possible.
- C. Determine if an extension of the project is possible and implement a phase out plan or an extension as soon as possible.
- D. Review the reporting practices from the Counterpart Consortium to USAID/CAR and determine if any changes in the present system are needed.

C. STAFF/HUMAN RESOURCES STRUCTURE

The modality of regional and country placement of staff in the Central Asian Republics has been a key factor in implementing the project. At first, it was designed that only a regional director would be required who would lead a consortium of four PVOs with program activities in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and one other country to be determined. The three components of the project were: (1) to identify local NGOs and provide them with training, technical assistance and small seed grants; (2) to provide more intensive support through US/Central Asian partnership grants; and (3) to stimulate corporate giving to Central Asian NGOs through a pilot matching grant effort.

1. FINDINGS

Once the Chief of Party of the Counterpart Consortium arrived in November, 1994, it became apparent that additional field staff would be required to successfully implement the project. The USAID/CAR Mission Director wanted results and impact so after three months, three field offices were opened-up with U.S. country directors in Almaty, Bishkek, and Tashkent. Two partners of the consortium also hired expatriots to direct their field offices and become circuit riders to all three countries. The third partner (Goodwill Industries International) hired an Uzbek who had just completed a Goodwill internship to be their country director in Tashkent and also act as a circuit rider to the other two countries in establishing Goodwill partnerships in Bishkek and Almaty.

The budgets were revised in order for the field staff and support staff in the states to provide for dynamic management for results. Budgets were provided for sufficient travel within the five Central Asian Republics and offices were established in four of the capital cities. Counterpart was requested in early 1996 to open the Dushanbe office with a locally hired American.

Presently, there are four Counterpart Consortium offices located in four of the five countries. Each has a Counterpart Foundation "Country Director" with the Chief of Party serving as both the Regional Director and Country Director of Kasakstan. In Bishkek, the Country Director also serves as the Regional Training Director. In Tashkent, the Country Director also hosts the office for Aid to Artisans and serves as support for the Goodwill Industries International program. In Dushanbe, the recently hired Country Representative serves as liaison with all the Counterpart Consortium programs. In addition, two expatriate Counterpart Interns serve in Tashkent and Almaty as NGO grant monitors and evaluators. They travel around to all four countries as needed.

Each of the three partners also has their own regional director. Aid to Artisans is based out of Tashkent but the Director is a circuit rider to both Bishkek and Almaty and she maintains apartments in all three countries. The Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs's Field Director is based in Kyrgyzstan with offices within the Counterpart Consortium located in Bishkek. He also travels to both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan but spends most of his effort in Kyrgyzstan. The newly appointed Country Representative of Goodwill Industries International is located in Tashkent. She was working as a Peace Corp Volunteer as acting representative until completing her service the middle of November. She will primarily work in Tashkent but will travel to both Almaty and Bishkek in locating potential partners for Goodwill in those cities. There are three trainers working in each of the four Counterpart Consortium offices. All twelve provide both training to the NGOs on a regular basis and technical assistance to the NGOs in preparing their work plans and grant proposals.

2. CONCLUSIONS

- A. The project design, as modified in the present staffing structure, is an effective use of the limited personnel covering four countries. It is extremely cost effective in providing training, technical assistance, and seed grants to more than double the original number of NGOs envisioned in the original project design.
- B. The combined package of technical and grant-making assistance is an effective approach in strengthening those NGOs who have received both small grants and training from the

Counterpart trainers. All the NGO focus groups indicated that this package was extremely beneficial to them.

- C. The Consortium model with a lead PVO and 3 sub-agreements has supported the overall efforts in strengthening the NGO sector in four countries. Each partner has received support from the lead PVO with the possible exception of Goodwill Industries International which has founded its own NGO, become registered, established its own bank account and began its store operations on its own.
- D. Counterpart has worked effectively with both ATA and CNFA in administering and managing both their sub-grants and the seed and partnership grants to their partner NGOs in Central Asia. The Counterpart Tashkent office has supported the work with the GII in Tashkent but the synergy with the overall Counterpart Consortium in Almaty hasn't worked as well.
- E. The Consortium model has been able to provide sound technical assistance through its team of 12 local trainers, Russian master trainer consultants, and from both the field staff and expatriate consultants from Counterpart, ATA and CNFA.
- F. The Consortium members have been able to report and communicate with USAID/CAR both through the Chief of Party and directly with copies to Counterpart through the e-mail. This system appears to be working in both an informal and more formal mode in monthly and quarterly reports from all the partners.
- G. This model is extremely cost-effective since all administrative and financial matters are handled out of one single prime office in Almaty where the Chief of Party also serves as both the Regional and Country Director of Kazakhstan. The financial officer in Almaty also serves as the focal point for all bank transfers from the U.S. partners to Central Asia. There is no duplication of these functions in the country offices.
- H. The model has been flexible in its design in supporting NGOs. There haven't been any quotas or targets by sectors. About 15 different sectors are represented in those NGOs receiving grants and technical assistance from the Counterpart Consortium.
- I. The regional nature of the program across four countries has stretched the human resources at times. The seven expatriate staff are often traveling between Almaty and other countries but that hasn't negatively affected their performance. With e-mail now installed in all countries, communication has vastly improved. The circuit rider aspect of the job for ATA and CNFA may have prevented them from providing equal effort in all three countries. ATA has concentrated in Uzbekistan but also has worked with NGOs in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. There is a need for additional ATA staff to effectively do follow-up and day-to-day liaison with its' nine NGO partners. CNFA has concentrated in Kyrgyzstan but also has worked with PFAs in the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan and in the Taldykorgan oblast in Kazakhstan.

D. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

The progress of program implementation according to both the quantitative and qualitative impact indicators that were expected at the beginning of the project can be measured in terms of the following:

1. Number of types of grants to NGOs in each country
2. Training effectiveness by the recipient NGOs
3. Utilization of grants by the NGOs to improve their operations and quality of services
4. Utilization of the technical assistance
5. Role of the NGOs in affecting public policy

Mobilization and start-up activities in Central Asia began 37 days following the signing of the Cooperative Agreement between USAID/CAR and Counterpart Foundation, Inc. the lead partner in the Consortium. The Chief of Party arrived in Almaty on November 4, 1994 to begin the project and offices were opened in Bishkek and Tashkent in January of 1995. The first quarterly status report on "Mobilization and Start-up Phase" was completed for the period October through December 1994.

Since then, both monthly and quarterly reports have been submitted to USAID/CAR which have depicted the activities of the individual Counterpart Consortium partners. The quarterly reports provide an overview of project management and the broad NGO sector support by Counterpart Foundation and each of the three partners. Each of the partners describe in narrative form the fulfillment of specific objectives, their activity status for the quarter, and the projected activity status of the next quarter. At the start-up, detailed work plans were approved by USAID/CAR for the first year of the project until December 1995. Since then, the quarterly reports have served as the work plan for the following quarter. Included in the list of attachments are performance plans for each of the partners depicting planned versus actual accomplishments for that quarter. Results and indicators are provided for each month of the project.

1. PARTNERSHIPS AND JOINT PROGRAMMING

Purpose: **To catalyze the development of creative partnerships between and among indigenous and foreign NGOs**

FINDINGS:

- 1.1 In Tajikistan, cooperation between the World Bank's "Poverty Alleviation Program" and Counterpart Foundation was established and a social investment fund for Tajikistan (TASIF) will be set-up. Counterpart will provide a consultant to help plan and implement training activities for management of the project. Relief International plans to partner with Odamiat, a Counterpart Grantee NGO.
- 1.2 A partnership was begun in September, 1996 with a grant given to the Women's League of Creative Initiative to develop a partnership between Almaty College of Art, Kazakhstan and Berea College Crafts Program in Kentucky, USA.
- 1.3 Aid to Artisans has formed 9 partnerships with NGOs in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and

Kazakstan. ATA is programming with the New York International Gift Fair and has jointly setup an ATA booth at the Fair and also has received orders from the Museum of Fine Arts in Houston, Summer Moon in the U.S., Silk Road Gallery and from a French importer.

- 1.4 Citizens Network for Public Affairs has formed 3 partnerships with the Oregon, Kentucky and Indiana Farm Bureaus with PFAs in Osh, Fergana, and Taldykorgan. Joint programming is going-on with GTZ in the Osh PFA. CNFA is cooperating with the following organizations in its assistance programs to PFAs in the three countries: Israel Embassy, Canadian Government, German Aid Agency (GTZ), TACIS, Eurasia Foundation, Peace Corps, Carana Corporation, Mercy Corps, ACDI, Dutch Development Organization (HIVOS), Winrock International.
- 1.5 Goodwill Industries International has formed a new organization in Tashkent called “Goodwill Intisiativa” which is partnering with Goodwill in Indianapolis.
- 1.6 Counterpart Foundation developed a partnership with a local Kyrgyz NGO support organization, Center Interbilim, for a joint project to create a NGO Resource Center in Bishkek with a satellite center in Osh in the Fergana Valley. This project is being funded through EU-TACIS and includes two European partners (Dutch InterChurch Aid and Christian Aid).
- 1.7 Also, two other partnerships have been developed with other U.S. PVOs.
- 1.8 Discussions are ongoing with several U.S. PVOs about establishing relationships in the CAR. They include: Elwyn Institute/SATR, US Child Welfare League/various NGOs, State Veterans Association/Almaty Region Veterans, Wheeled Mobility Center/ARDI, CIVITAN International/Special Olympics, National Parents Network on Disabilities/ARDI.
- 1.9 Counterpart has facilitated a partnership between a local Tajik NGO support organization (FSCI and Counterpart Germany) resulting in the jointly developed proposal for a NGO Resource Center in Dushanbe which is being funded by EU-TACIS.
- 1.10 Counterpart became a sub-contractor to the Academy for Educational Development (AED) under the USAID/NIS Exchanges and Training Program (NET). As the training provider, Counterpart designed a participant training program for 42 CAR NGOs. Overall, the group was exposed to more than 200 U.S. NGOs in 14 states with about 50 of the host organizations making plans for continuing work with the participants. The Child Welfare League of America and the Sierra Club are planning for a return visit to Central Asia.

CONCLUSIONS:

- A. Joint programming and the formation of partnerships has been on-going with both other U.S. grantees/institutions and international groups such as UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, GTZ, HIVOS, World Bank.

2. BROAD NGO SUPPORT (COUNTERPART FOUNDATION)

Purpose: **To identify and empower a broad array of Central Asian non-governmental organizations in both rural and urban areas, regardless of sectoral focus.**

FINDINGS

- 2.1 The number of NGO grants has grown to 194 exceeding the original target of 85 expected by the end of the project. The total amount spent as of November 9, 1996 was \$1.123 million. which has exceeded the original project target of \$921,000. The current target for grants to NGOs has increased with Amendment #7 by \$353,000 to \$1.274 million.
- 2.2 The Seed Grants have greatly exceeded the original target of 50 to have reached 163 for a total amount of \$829,000 or an average of about \$5,000 each.
- 2.3 The Partnership Grants are right on target at 15 for a total of \$189,000 or an average of about \$13,000 per grant.
- 2.4 The Corporate Challenge Grants have reached 16 with a target of reaching 20 by the end of the project. Counterpart Consortium approved a total of \$105,000 or an average of about \$6,500 per grant. Counterpart can only provide a maximum of \$10,000 per Challenge Grant. In some cases, the corporate contributions to local organizations have exceeded that amount. Therefore, the corporations have donated about \$154,000. Ten of the 16 co-sponsors were locally owned companies.
- 2.5 Fifteen different sectors comprise the grant profile with the largest sector (20%) being "Civil Society/Human Rights." The following is the rank order of NGO grantees by sector as of November 9, 1996:

Civil Society/Human Rights	35	
Children/Youth	29	
Women	23	
Ecology/Environment		21
Disabled	19	
Education	15	
Legal/Judicial	12	
Health	9	
Agriculture	9	
Crafts/Artists/Culture	9	
Pensioners/poor families	5	
Business promotion	3	
Media	2	
Cultural/Ethnic groups	1	
Refugees	1	

- 2.6 The total number of NGOs registered in the Counterpart Foundation Database has grown to

1,302 in four of the five Central Asian Republics. Kyrgyzstan has the largest number of NGOs listed in the database with 467, followed by Uzbekistan (327), Kazakhstan (273), and Tajikistan (235).

- 2.7 About 40 percent of the NGOs receiving grants from the Counterpart Consortium were located in blasts outside of the capital cities. Of the proposals submitted to the various Counterpart Offices, about 75 percent are deemed appropriate to be brought before the Grant Committee each month. Of those about 60 percent are approved often with contingencies attached before the funds are released.
- 2.8 Three regional offices were opened in Kyrgyzstan, all with outside funding from other agencies. The offices are located in Jalal-Abad and Kara-Balta with UNHCR funding and the recent one is in Naryn with funding from the World Bank Pilot Demonstration Project and from the Swiss agency, HELVETAS. Each office will have two staff members supporting NGOs and Counterpart is developing their skills in program management and training.
- 2.9 Two locally trained training contractor NGOs are each working in Almaty, Bishkek, and Tashkent supporting the training program. They are contracted to deliver the two-day “NGO and Community” training workshop. Each of the six contractors provide about one workshop per week in each of the three cities.
- 2.10 Counterpart has 12 full-time trainers with three each located in each of the four capital cities. They are extremely busy working on developing and delivering the existing four training modules as well as providing daily consulting to the NGOs in proposal development and grant management. The following is a summary of the training provided by Counterpart during the past one and a half years. During that time, 152 workshops were held in four countries encompassing 1,271 NGOs with 2,198 participants. (See Table 1)
- 2.11 The Counterpart offices are linked by e-mail and the NGO resource center in Bishkek is established to provide NGOs with this service as well. Bishkek is developing a Web Page for the Internet so that the database can be accessed on the Internet.

CONCLUSIONS:

- A. Counterpart Foundation as the lead partner in the consortium has achieved its original targets and exceeded them in some cases.
- B. The grant program is moving ahead with the additional obligated funds projected to be spent by the January Grant Review Meeting.
- C. The training program is extremely effective with positive feedback coming from all the focus groups interviewed. The three groups of trainers interviewed all expressed very strong commitments to continuing with the training since it is the core of NGO sustainability which is bringing about social, economic and governmental policy change.

- D. The use of the trainers and the two interns for providing technical assistance to the NGOs has placed a heavy load on their shoulders. They are already stretched to the limit with the existing four module training program and travel to the more rural blasts for training has taken time. They would like to develop some new modules for delivery as the more mature NGOs develop and they have requested continuing consulting from the trainers.
- E. The use of the Database as the foundation for an NGO support system appears to be needed in the networking by the developing NGOs in the four countries

3. **TARGETED NGO SUPPORT BY THE CONSORTIUM PARTNERS:**

AID TO ARTISANS

Purpose: **To create financially sustainable NGOs in Central Asia through crafts-based Micro enterprise development.**

FINDINGS:

- 3.1 ATA's goal, according to their Field Director, is to create a network of sustainable, service-oriented handicraft business associations able to assist a regional membership of craft producers in generating incomes and improving economic self-reliance in a market economy.
- 3.2 ATA's program seeks to demonstrate that by coming together within associations, artisan-entrepreneurs can collectively solve many of the problems they face in this transition period. They will have a voice in shaping the growth and structure of a regional craft industry.
- 3.3 Artisans face the following key problems which can be addressed through NGO action:
 - a. Lack of understanding of business principles and free market dynamics.
 - b. Lack of belief that self initiative can bring results.
 - c. Lack of understanding about consumer tastes and demands and level of competition within product categories in a global marketplace.
 - d. Lack of marketing venues, particularly for rural craft people.
 - e. Lack of quality raw materials at affordable prices.
 - f. Lack of connection to outside information sources and potential allies within world craft movement.
 - g. Limited production capacity.
 - h. Restrictive government policies such as small business taxation and export taxes.
- 3.4 During the past 18 months, ATA has worked with a core network of 9 craft business associations representing approximately 350 micro-enterprises in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. ATA has provided indirect marketing assistance to an additional 12 craft NGOs throughout the region. Artisans represented by these associations include: professional master craftspeople, unemployed or under-employed men and women in both urban and rural areas who have turned to craft production as a new means of livelihood, pensioners, and students seeking practical vocational skills or a better understanding of

market dynamics.

- 3.5 ATA has 3 main strategies: 1) to assist artisans in better understanding the craft market and in increasing profits through craft sales through improved product design and test marketing opportunities; 2) to work with artisans and NGO leaders to define real needs of craft producers as their businesses grow and to foster confidence in NGO action as a means of solving problems; and 3) to work with NGO leaders to redefine NGO service programs to meet these needs and to secure initial and long-term funding for these programs.
- 3.6 ATA product design assistance and marketing efforts conducted through local NGOs have directly generated over \$80,000 in craft sales which is projected to rise to \$100,000 by the end of 1996. This figure does not reflect independent daily retail sales by artisans or NGO retail outlets which have also risen dramatically as a result of new product lines and a new market-driven approach to sales. Artisans have begun to market products inter-regionally through ATA's NGO contacts and internationally through ATA's export program which has started to generate profits for the NGOs.
- 3.7 Nine ATA/NGO Partners have redefined organizational structures to better meet members needs and have emerged as service-oriented NGOs with tangible assistance to offer members. They have all received funding and training from the Counterpart Consortium and Mercy Corps to support new programs for one year. These NGOs are now serving as models for other organizations in regions not yet reached by ATA and have begun similar initiatives.

CONCLUSIONS:

- A. As a result of ATA business training and local and international regional marketing efforts, NGO leaders and artisan members have a much stronger understanding of basic market principles and incomes have increased noticeably.
- B. Encouraged by sales results and guided by ATA training, one-on-one consultations, the Counterpart NGO development training program, models of craft NGO structures shared by ATA, and through the recent NET U.S. leadership training program, the artisans and NGO leaders are working together with ATA in setting strategies to meet their needs. A new confidence in NGOs and collective action has arisen with increased participation in ATA/NGO training workshops, increased membership and volunteerism within the NGOs.
- C. All nine of the ATA/NGO Partners have redefined their assistance strategies and organizational structures in order to better meet their members' needs. They have emerged as service-oriented NGOs with tangible assistance to offer their members.

CITIZENS NETWORK FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS:

Purpose: **To assist in the creation of democratic and pluralistic participation, promote the economic viability of rural communities and raise the quality of life for people of rural Central Asia.**

FINDINGS:

- 3.8 CNFA's Field Director is working with private farmer associations in the three countries of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in strengthening their structures and ability to influence government farm policies and increase the benefits of farming to the members of such associations. Contacts in Tajikistan have also been established for a possible partnership with CNFA's Farm Bureau partnership program.
- 3.9 Three Partnerships have been formed between the Oregon Farm Bureau and the Osh Oblast Private Farmers' Association in Kyrgyzstan, the Kentucky Farm Bureau and the Fergana Oblast PFA in Uzbekistan, and the Indiana Farm Bureau and the Taldykorgan Oblast PFA in Kazakhstan in an attempt to strengthen their organizational capacity and increase their paid membership in order to help resolve land tenure and agricultural production and marketing problems. To further support these partnerships, each PFA has received a partnership grant from the Consortium. Ten seed grants were given to various PFAs in three countries.
- 3.10 Through the Osh partnership with the Oregon Farm Bureau, CNFA was able to create the Osh Union of PFAs. Prior to that partnership, there wasn't any oblast-level private farmer association in this important Kyrgyz agricultural region.
- 3.11 The Osh Union's Harvest Festival was a major success and attracted an estimated 5,000 persons to its events. It was supported in part by CNFA funds and was the first such major event in Kyrgyzstan.
- 3.12 55 PFA members have already been trained by the Counterpart Foundation's workshops and 7 PFA leaders have attended USDA's Cochran Program in the United States.
- 3.13 9 experts from the three state Farm Bureau partners have spent a total of 200 person-days of training with their PFA counterparts on assignments in such areas as Board Development, Management Structures and Policy Development.
- 3.14 3 PFA leaders have been hosted by their Oregon and Kentucky Farm Bureau partners for a total of 58 person-days of training and one attended the NGO Leadership Training under the NET program.
- 3.15 The PFAs have also benefitted from associations with other USAID contractors such as ACDI in farm credit, Mercy Corps, Winrock International, and TACIS for the development of a crop loan program. Leveraging assistance from other agencies such as VOCA, HIVOS, the Canadian Embassy, the USDA, the Peace Corps, GTZ and VOCA.

CONCLUSIONS:

- A. The farm associations are becoming better organized and with additional assistance from the Counterpart Consortium and their partners at CNFA and the partnership relationships with the Farm Bureaus in the U.S., they should become more effective in formulating agricultural policy with the PFA memberships.

- B. The Fergana PFA is largely made up of compulsory members from the previous government farm association but in the other two partnerships, the membership is voluntary. As a result of forming the partnership with the Osh PFA, dues-paying membership has quadrupled from 75 to 320.
- C. Leveraging is a major positive factor in this project as CNFA has facilitated and supported linkages with U.S. and international NGOs in working with the newly formed PFAs. In Osh, 10 organizations are working; in Fergana, 4 organizations and in Taldykorgan 5 organizations are collaborating with the oblast PFAs.

GOODWILL INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL:

Purpose: To transfer the Goodwill model of NGO and micro-enterprise development, vocational rehabilitation, and employment generation to Central Asia in order to improve the standard of living and quality of life for people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups within the population.

FINDINGS:

- 3.15 Goodwill Initiativa has officially been established and is operating its retail store in Tashkent as of July 12, 1996. The process of obtaining a retail license and operating within the official regulations for non-profit organizations required an arduous effort and all transactions are through bank transfers in local currency (soom).
- 3.16 The vocational rehabilitation segment of the model has yet to become operational with the exception of a small sewing project in a disabled woman's home.
- 3.17 The local Board of Directors has submitted a formal work plan to GII in early September with revised scope of work and budget revision covering the period until the end of June 1997. The plan calls for opening a second store in December in another location in Tashkent, and for the establishment of the rehabilitation center by March/April of 1997. The establishment of the rehabilitation center will depend upon the return from Goodwill Indiana of the manager who will be trained at Goodwill through an internship in Vocational Rehabilitation Management using the Goodwill Model. The nominated manager is waiting formal approval from the local Board of Directors in Tashkent.
- 3.18 The Indianapolis Goodwill has provided goods valued in excess of \$32,000 for two shipments to its Tashkent Partner, the second of which is expected to arrive within three months. GII provided funding for the shipment of the second container from another grant.
- 3.19 The Database of potential clients for the Tashkent Rehabilitation Center has expanded and areas of training have been identified in related skills such as computer and office equipment operators and maintenance.
- 3.20 The GII Field Representative is a present Peace Corps Volunteer but she will complete her Peace Corps service the middle of November and become a full-time employee of GII and the Field Representative for Central Asia located in Uzbekistan. She will also identify

possible Goodwill partners in Almaty and Bishkek during the next seven months.

CONCLUSIONS:

- A. Delays were inevitable in the implementation of this project in establishing three Goodwill Partnerships in the three cities of Tashkent, Almaty, and Bishkek. The initial work plan was unrealistic due to the “Mission-imposed requirement” that GII abandon its initial plan to work with the host organization, CAFE in the start-up of the Goodwill Model Partnership in Uzbekistan. GII had counted on beginning with a “hosting” relationship with an already established NGO.
- B. The lack of existing partners delayed the start-up of the Goodwill programs in all three countries. People had to be identified who would work with GII and develop local boards of directors which included disabled members. The present Chairman of the Board of Directors (Bahadir Rasulov) had been trained in the Goodwill Rehabilitation Internship in the U.S. but when he returned to Uzbekistan, he had a heart attack and was asked to reduce his work effort in directing the organization. Subsequently, a new director was hired to become the Director of Goodwill Initsiativa (Bekhzod Yakubov). As a consequence, the new organization is developing more slowly than originally planned.
- C. Now is the time to move ahead with the training of local staff in vocational rehabilitation management in order for the rehabilitation center to become a reality.
- D. The retail store is functioning well and generating revenue that will be used to operate the newly established rehabilitation center when it plans to open next April.

4. **LEVERAGING NON-USAID SUPPORT (Challenge Grants, Other Donors)**

FINDINGS:

- 4.1 The project has leveraged \$90,500 from 11 local corporations by providing challenge grants to local NGOs in Almaty, Bishkek, Tashkent, and Dushanbe. In addition, three international corporations contributed about \$63,500 to local organizations such as the Almaty Little League Baseball (\$40,000), the Junior Achievement in Kazakstan (\$10,000), the Social and Employment Center (\$7,500), and the Voluntary Society of Diabetics (\$6,000).
- 4.2 Three regional offices have been opened in Kyrgyzstan that are supported by World Bank, UNHCR and HELVETAS. These offices receive technical support by the Resource Center in Bishkek through Counterpart’s partner NGO “InterBilim” which receives support from TACIS, HIVOS, DIA, and Christian Aid UK.
- 4.3 Counterpart and the American Legal Consortium combined resources to co-sponsor the regional conference on NGOs and the Law and continue to work together in supporting the Working Group on Legal Reform in Uzbekistan.
- 4.4 The trainers are benefitting from outside groups who have provided TOT from INTRAC’s (U.K. firm) training on “Participatory Rural Development” and the joint World Learning-

Counterpart workshop on “Public Education Through the Media”

- 4.5 Outside experts from organizations such as the UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR, Overseas Strategic Consulting, and TACIS have provided inputs into the Counterpart TOT quarterly workshops.
- 4.6 Other international donors who are working with private farmer associations supported by Counterpart and CNFA are a mixture of international and U.S. organizations such as:
 - European Union (TACIS) in Osh
 - Mercy Corps International (USDA monetization funds) credit in Osh
 - Peace Corps (PCV Small Enterprise Dev. Volunteer) in Osh
 - ACDI (USDA monetization funds) credit in Osh
 - U.S./Kyrgyz Joint Commission funded Mercy Corps loan programs
 - German (GTZ) in Osh.
 - Carana Corporation (Market price information)
 - HIVOS International (grants to PFA)
- 4.7 Counterpart has obtained EU-TACIS funding to support a NGO Resource Center in Dushanbe, which Counterpart Germany and a local NGO support organization, the Foundation for Support of Civic Initiative (FSCI) will manage. Counterpart has also obtained funding to support a NGO Resource Center in Kyrgyzstan in partnership with Center Interbilim and two European partners.
- 4.8 Counterpart has leveraged resources from Save the Children to cost-share its operation in Tajikistan.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

- A. The Counterpart Consortium is leveraging many of its activities with other donors and other grantees/contractors. The communication network is working well and there isn't any apparent duplication of effort. On the contrary, the synergy derived from collaborations are the rule rather than the exception.
- B. The Consortium members have each developed their own implementation strategies at the beginning of the project and have modified them as conditions warranted. Initial work plans were designed for the first year and subsequently, the quarterly projected activity status for the next quarter is presented in the quarterly reports. By the very nature of this project, planning has been on a long-term basis in order to leave behind sustainable NGOs. However, the quarterly planning (short-term) has provided each partner with the ability to assess where they are at the moment and how far they plan to go during the next three months. This seems to be working according to the feedback from both the Counterpart Consortium staff and the customers of the services (NGOs). Both the quality and quantity

of the activities have exceeded the original targets in the proposals.

- C. The Consortium has not targeted a defined recipient audience but has promoted an open invitation to participate in its programs. Fifteen sectors have been categorized on the Counterpart Consortium NGOs Database with 1302 NGOs registered. The number of grants and training provided to NGOs closely reflects to profile on the database.
- D. The Counterpart Consortium program of NGO support activities in diverse sectors is supporting and meeting the needs of those NGOs who chose to participate. After almost two years operating in the CAR, NGOs come to the Counterpart Offices and program activities without direct advertising by Counterpart. The NGO network that Counterpart has helped create has become more mature and is requiring somewhat different types of training and support in the future. These advocacy NGOs are working to influence public policy and to create an NGO environment conducive for sustainability. They are supporting the objectives of USAID's strategic objectives.
- E. The program activities are complimentary of other donor efforts in Central Asia and in many activities are joint ventures.
- F. The training program is providing relevant and focused modules in four areas (NGO & Community, Strategic Planning, NGO Management & Project Design, and NGOs & the Media). These workshops are provided in four countries with only Turkmenistan lacking a venue due to the fact that Counterpart does not have the mandate from USAID to work there. However, Turkmen NGOs are participating in training being held in other republics. The Counterpart-trained local trainers also provide technical assistance to NGOs in addition to leading the workshops in the four covered countries. Kyrgyzstan has led all countries in the number of participants trained (804) in 55 different workshops. Kazakhstan is a close second with 733 participants trained in 39 workshops. Uzbekistan had 479 trained in 37 workshops and Tajikistan had 182 participants in 21 workshops. These workshops are tailored to the special needs of each country since the three trainers and the two training contractors are citizens of the country in which they work. Therefore, each country relates each of the four modules to the special circumstances of that country.
- G. Counterpart's country offices are providing sufficient information to the training director who is based in Bishkek. The Counterpart country offices are networked with the head training office in Bishkek by e-mail as well as the monthly round table and review meetings in Almaty which provide an opportunity to share views.
- H. There has been a beneficial impact from all the training modules given to 1,271 NGOs through a series of 152 workshops. The Monitoring and Evaluation questionnaire asked each NGO for feedback and to rank the importance of 17 potential areas for further development. The areas suggested in order of importance are as follows:
 - 1. NGO Taxation and Legal Issues
 - 2. Financial Management and Principles of Sustainability

3. Relations Between NGOs and State Structures
4. Human and Material Resource Management
5. NGOs and Human Rights Advocacy
6. Strategic Planning
7. Relations Between NGOs and Business
8. Leadership Training
9. Communications with Public and Mass Media
10. Team Building
11. Monitoring and Evaluation
12. Working with Volunteers
13. Conflict Resolution
14. Principles of Umbrella Organizations
15. Lobbying
16. Boards of Directors
17. Training for Small Business Management

I. The training-of-trainers program (TOT) has been effective in many ways. It has used Russian speaking trainers from Russia who have been very well received by Counterpart's trainers as well as the NGO training contractors. The training has been relevant within the context of the Central Asian NGO community which has a very different dynamics from other communities outside of the CIS. The local trainers would like to become sustainable within their own organization and still retain the TOT network with the Russian trainers in Moscow. These issues will have to be addressed in the near future for sustainability of the NGO Support System in Central Asia.

J. The impact of the Consortium's grant program on the development of the NGO community cannot be separated from the impact of the training program since they both go hand-to-hand. Grants are not given without training and follow-up. Since all of the 194 grants have been awarded after careful review and revisions to proposals that have been developed within the various workshops, the impact of the grant activity cannot be separated from the other variables such as training and the technical consulting provided by the trainers. All the grants are in process of being evaluated from 3 to 6 months following the initial payment to the NGO. About 50 percent of the grantees have been evaluated and most of those have been the seed grants.

The three types of grants all serve a unique purpose in serving the objectives of the project. The Partnership Grants (15) are probably the most important as far as serving to establish a sustainable link with a U.S. organization. However, the Seed Grants (163) serve a vital role in often getting the NGO established on a firm footing. Finally, the Challenge Grants (16) foster local partnering with corporations who hopefully will continue their joint sponsorship of activities within those NGOs. These also serve the objectives of the project and take more time in nurturing and seeking out appropriate sponsors.

K. The legal and regulatory policy framework in each of the four countries affect the

sustainability of the NGO community. The project is fostering the “bottom-up” approach with NGOs membership being a critical factor in gaining political influence in order to promote social and economic policies that will promote NGOs. USAID has completed its American Legal Consortium project but Counterpart is continuing to support the Working Group on Legal Reform in Uzbekistan, the Forum of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan and Interlegal in Kazakhstan.

Without adequate NGO laws and policies that promote their development and financial sustainability, the network of NGOs in the Central Asian Republics will be hindered in their missions. In most of the countries, NGO legislation is waiting to be acted upon by the various governments.

- L. The project is marketing itself with services that the NGO community deems important such as training and the establishment of resource centers with databases and communication linkages via e-mail to the Internet and other information sources. Regional resource centers seem important in including the rural NGOs in the network. Therefore, it does not appear necessary to have a separate “social marketing component” of the program.
- M. Timing of any program intervention is important. The program has only been operational less than two years and in some countries began only this year. In order for the intended impact to occur, more time will be needed to bring those organizations into the next stage of maturity. Training and a support system of technical assistance in more specialized areas will be needed during the next stage.

E. MONITORING and EVALUATION PLAN

Monitoring and evaluation systems enable the project’s managers to adjust the program’s strategy and adapt the implementation plan accordingly. Self-evaluation is an important component of any project especially if one’s resources are limited.

1. FINDINGS

The Counterpart Consortium during the first year of the project produced a “**Monitoring and Evaluation Plan: Practical Approaches for Results Management**”. All partners were involved in the development of the plan which was printed in August of 1995. The purpose was to design M&E systems that respond to the information needs of project managers and to assist them in *managing for results* through access to useful, timely, cost-effective and transparent management information. This approach intended to recognize the need for *practical systems* which do not overburden management practices already in use by each of the Consortium partners. The results to date have been mixed.

- 1.1 The M&E systems monitor performance at four main levels of the project design: Activities, Outputs, Intended Results, and Purpose. The system produced a set of quarterly *Performance Plans* with monitoring and reporting systems for tracking each of the project’s main components. A summary of the status of project Activities was included by each partner in their Monthly Report. In the Quarterly report, each partner monitors its success

in carry out the work plan for the previous quarter and makes any necessary changes in the work plan for the upcoming quarter. However, USAID indicated that by the time they receive the Quarterly Reports, its often unable to use the *Performance Plans* in suggesting any changes in the next quarter's work plan.

- 1.2 Each partner produces separate "*Performance Plans*" each quarter which were used to compare planned results for a specific project component against actual results. These quarterly updates are used in planning the activities for the next quarter.
- 1.3 Training was monitored both during and immediately after using simple questionnaires. Trainees were and still are requested to submit a report on training effectiveness no earlier than 3 months and no later than 6 months following their completing their training workshop.
- 1.4 The grantees are required to submit narrative reports in Russian and English to Counterpart Consortium quarterly or as determined by their respective grant payment schedule. Additional payments are not provided until the grantee has submitted their report.
- 1.5 Both the monitoring reports from trainees and grantees are planned to be entered into the database which would give a more complete picture of the activity of the NGOs with whom Counterpart Consortium works. About 80 of the NGOs have been interviewed and the information from the Monitoring and Evaluation Questionnaire entered into the Database.
- 1.6 Counterpart is using two expatriate interns who are both fluent in Russian and English to implement the interviewing and translate the questionnaires into English before being entered into the Database. About 167 questionnaires have been completed in Russian and interviews have been completed on about 80 of those but only about 45 questionnaires have been entered into the Database in English. The two interns joined Counterpart in early 1996 and are based in Almaty and in Tashkent. They travel to all the countries in doing the interviewing and translating the questionnaires. This is a very large task.
- 1.7 Quarterly pipeline analyses are included for each of the partners. The latest pipeline analysis through September 30, 1996 indicated that about 30% (\$1.7 million) of the total USAID grant budget remained with 8 months or 24 percent of the time remaining. The Aid to Artisans partner has about 26 percent (\$140,000) of its budget remaining. Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs has about 35 percent (\$295,000) of its budget remaining. Goodwill Industries International has about 72 percent (\$216,000) of its budget remaining.

2. CONCLUSIONS

- 2.1 The Counterpart Consortium has an elaborate Monitoring and Evaluation Plan in place and uses the backstopping staff in the States to analyze the data gathered and determine if adjustments to its implementation plan need to take place. The *Performance Plans are revised quarterly in the States* and adjustments made in the field through the respective partners home offices. Since the project is in its last quarter of operation, the urgency to

adjust may not be that urgent since the overall feeling is that the project is going extremely well and that the customers (NGOs) and the stakeholders (members and target groups) seem to be very positive with the program.

- 2.2 The targets from the initial work plan don't link well with the new strategic objectives (SO 2.1) of increasing better-informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making. The three intermediate results (IR 2.1.1 *NGO's participation in civil society strengthened*; 2.1.2 *Increased availability of information through independent media addressing democratic processes and issues*; and 2.1.3 *Increased responsiveness of government to citizens/citizen organizations*) need to be linked with the indicators listed in the "Performance Plans".
- 2.3 The amount of time and energy spent on "self-evaluation" does not seem to be detracting from the Counterpart Consortium staffs ability to implement activities. However, the two interns are heavily burdened with numerous duties including translating the questionnaires and interviewing. The only major time spent on "self-evaluation" is in the monthly reports that list the activities carried out and are sent back to the respective home offices of the partners.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 3.1 Continue with the implementation of the overall *Monitoring and Evaluation Plan*.
- 3.2 Revise the Monitoring and Evaluation Plan to better reflect the new USAID strategic objectives and link each of the project's objectives with one or more of the intermediate results for each of the Consortium partners including Counterpart Foundation, Inc.

F. PROGRAM SUSTAINABILITY

The issue of continuity of the program activities following project close-out is of concern to most of the NGOs who are benefitting from the Counterpart Consortium. The self motivation of the NGOs is paramount in concentrating on achievable goals. It is this sense of collective self esteem that will breed success. NGOs will network within their sector to find the financial and human resources to fulfill their mission.

The Counterpart Consortium's role has been and will continue to provide the skills necessary for NGO growth and development. It is the job of the NGO itself to adapt those skills to the Central Asian environment. Financial support is necessary as a catalyst. However, it is the training, continued moral and technical support, and successful projects that will make a sustainable organization.

In the near future, governments will realize the social value and financial benefits of community service providers. Only then, will fiscal incentives become a way of life. This *third sector* must first prove itself as a people centered provider of services. Governments will then extend their own desire to provide an optimum quality of life for its citizens.

CONCLUSIONS:

- A. Training as a component will survive beyond the life of the cooperative agreement since the present core of 12 trainers and 6 local NGO contractors have a keen desire to continue. They will either find some other donor support or establish their own NGOs and work as technical consultants and trainers for a fee.
- B. The Partnerships formulated during the project will succeed only as long as their American partner provides moral support in continuing with some association such as internships, exchanges of leaders and the maintenance of strong linkages via the Internet and other forms of communication.
- C. The Database will continue with other organizations such as InterBelim in Bishkek. The informational networks that have already been formed augur well for maintaining and expanding the NGO Database for all five countries on the Internet.
- D. The corporate giving patterns that have been started within the *Challenge Grant Program* has a good chance of continuing with both local and international corporations.
- E. All the components of the program have contributed to the development of sustainable Central Asian NGOs. The training and technical assistance provided by the trainers and the TOT from outside Russian trainers will continue to be some of the most valuable aspects of this program.
- F. The regional offices and their satellite offices being established in the more rural blasts are extremely valuable in maintaining strong and sustainable NGOs. The presence of a “*support system*” is paramount to empowering these young organizations.
- G. The grants component will play a lesser role in the future as other sources of funding and fund raising become a major part of the culture. However, the seed grants will continue to be part of the package necessary to develop newly formed NGOs and those in rural areas.

G. LESSONS LEARNED

- 1. Mid-term participatory evaluations should be implemented about midway through a project’s term in order for the greatest benefit for that project. This project only has about 7 months remaining from the original 33 months or about 20%. It is about time to be thinking about what is next and the staff is becoming increasingly concerned about the life of this project.
- 2. Personnel and financial management are key areas that require professional management from within the country and from the partners’ home offices. This project had a different staff than originally proposed in the cooperative agreement and yet, it worked as a team of dedicated and professional members due to the transparent management style of all consortium members. Even though each office has an accountant, the central control from Almaty of all bank transfers has proved effective in financial control.

3. Having an agreed upon Monitoring and Evaluation Plan at the beginning of the project is key in implementing a consortium-type of project both efficiently and effectively. Each partner knew what their purpose and targets were for each component which has alleviated any extraneous activities by both the home offices and the field staff. The entire consortium team knows what the program is and the strategy for implementing it.
4. Operating in the same local bank as the donor agency doesn't mean that your assets are secure. Trust your own sources for determining when to move funds from the bank into one's own safety. The bigger the safe doesn't always mean that your money is safer.
5. Use of Peace Corps Volunteers and internships within your program is an expeditious way of leveraging for the long-term utilization of expatriate staff who are familiar with both the culture and the environment.

H. OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS AND ACTION PLAN

The *Central Asia NGO Support Initiative* was proposed as a 2-1/2 year activity to help the citizens of the five republics of Central Asia more actively and effectively participate in the political and economic life of their countries. At the end of this period, it was expected that there would be significant growth in the number of indigenous NGOs expressing and advocating their interests, checking government powers, and/or providing services not provided by the government. Secondly, in at least 3 Central Asian countries, there would be a legal and regulatory environment more conducive to NGO creation and growth. Thirdly, that most of the assisted NGOs would have a core staff capable of using their improved skills in a variety of areas critical to their long-term viability.

Within this context, the Counterpart Consortium began its work in early 1995 by opening three small offices in Almaty, Bishkek and Tashkent. In early 1996, a fourth office was opened in Dushanbe. The recommendations included here will cover both the overall consortium project and also the individual partners. An action plan covering the period remaining in the present project until June 30, 1997 and some options for an extension of the project beyond that period will also be outlined.

OVERALL CONSORTIUM RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Encourage the network of NGOs to improve their communication and information-sharing network. Work more intensively on the education through the media type workshops to educate both the public and the governments of the five Central Asian Republics on the advantages of promoting this "*Third Sector*". Continue to improve and expand the NGO Database among all five countries and assist in the linking-up all the various NGO Resource Centers with e-mail and Internet connections.
2. Concentrate on the "practical" and "high payoff" development and nurturing of creative partnerships among indigenous and foreign NGOs. The country offices should be encouraged to work directly with the existing 15 partnerships in developing a dynamic relationship between or among all the organizations that are involved. These partnerships

will only be sustainable if the linkages between them are transparent and each perceives the value of maintaining them.

3. Emphasize and expand the training program into new modules and into more remote areas of Central Asia. Develop further the ability of local training sub-contractors to deliver more of the basic training modules while allowing the Counterpart Consortium Trainers to expand their efforts into both new modules and into the rural blasts outside of the capital cities. Continue to use training consultants from Russia to develop the new training modules with the Counterpart Trainers.. Train more trainers in these areas in order to contract-out the training in these more remote areas. The use of contractor trainers allows the program to reach out to a larger number of NGOs.
4. Continue to provide technical and financial advice to the NGO community in leveraging outside resources. The Country Directors, the trainers, the interns and the NGO Resource Centers all should provide this type of information. More effort should be spent in opening *NGO Resource Centers* in the Tashkent, Almaty, and Dushanbe offices. The center in Bishkek is working very well in conjunction with a local NGO (InterBilim) and it provides Internet and e-mail services through IREX. Explore the possibility of opening satellite offices in Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, and Tajikistan. The three new satellite offices in Kyrgyzstan are providing valuable services without any additional cost to USAID since their modest costs were covered by other donors.
5. Develop an integrated “*Package of Services*” for all five Central Asian Countries that includes training, consultants, small grants, access to corporate support, partnership development, database development, and information sharing. These linkages should be strengthened within each of the Counterpart Consortium offices. Publications and active mass media coverage should be part of the package.
6. Encourage the Counterpart Consortium’s offices and satellite offices to provide services and sustain themselves as the project eventually phases-out. The most critical element in this successful transition into sustainable local NGOs is to develop leadership capacity among the local staff. Fostering leadership development should be a deliberate part of any follow-on program.

AID TO ARTISANS RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Continue the technical assistance to the 9 NGO Partners in order to transform this initial activity into a dynamic, bona fide craft movement in Central Asia. Continued product development, business training, market assistance and establishment of links between Central Asian NGOs and other NGOs worldwide is required. Continued lobbying of governments through NGOs to support craft industry development is also vital in supporting the new inter-regional NGO network begun in conjunction with ATA sales.
2. Explore the possibilities of expanding ATA’s outreach to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan in response to queries from groups in these countries. A program in these countries should be

modeled after ATA's successful program in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan by linking artisans into marketing outlets established in the larger urban centers.

3. Increase local staff support to improve program efficiency in all the countries in which ATA is working. Local coordinators should be full-time staff who maintain an ATA "office" when the Field Director is traveling to other countries. The "*Coordinator*" would provide information and product advice to artisans and NGO leaders and follow-up on all the work conducted during the ATA workshops and marketing efforts. Each local "*Coordinator*" would require back-up support from Counterpart and have a permanent desk and computer in an "office" where ATA materials can be displayed.
4. Develop and distribute printed training materials and one-page informational brochures outlining basic business concepts and "Craft NGO Models". A training material budget would support the growth of NGO partners by enabling them to develop informational brochures and a regional newsletter about their groups and how they are working with ATA in Central Asia.

THE CITIZENS NETWORK FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Continue the technical assistance to the 3 Private Farmer Associations (PFAs) and strengthen the partnership relationships with the Oregon, Kentucky and Indiana Farm Bureaus. Increase the exchanges in both directions of farm bureau experts and PFA representatives to the U.S.
2. Establish two additional partnerships between the Issykul oblast PFA (Kyrgyzstan) and an American Farm Bureau and either the Zhezkusgan or Almaty oblast PFAs (Kazakhstan) and another American Farm Bureau.
3. Explore the possibility of establishing relationships with PFAs in Tajikistan.
4. Continue supporting PFAs through a combination of the Counterpart Consortium training and the seed grant program. Without the seed grant program, the training and technical assistance would be severely limited with new PFAs.
5. Strengthen both existing and new PFAs through a package of activities such as specialized workshops, a Central Asian Leadership PFA Meeting and Exchanges, harvest festivals, and lobbying workshops. Increase the number and scope of the training visits to both the United States and to Russia and Ukrainian PFAs already established by CNFA and the state Farm Bureaus.
6. Increase the staff capability of the CNFA office in Bishkek by hiring an additional "*Program Assistant*" and "*expat Intern*" if the activities in Tajikistan become a reality and new PFAs receive grants and training from the Counterpart Consortium.
7. Continue to work with the Kyrgyzstan Osh Union and the ACDI staff in the establishment of the Osh Credit Association.

GOODWILL INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Approve the revised work plan and budget as soon as possible in order for the local Tashkent Goodwill Partner to move ahead on the development of the rehabilitation program and the establishment of the second store.
2. Continue to provide technical assistance to the Tashkent Goodwill Partner as needed in fostering the vocational rehabilitation component of the program as well as the revenue producing retail stores in two locations.
3. Explore the feasibility of potential Goodwill partners in other cities such as Almaty and Bishkek.
4. Depending on the progress of the internship training at Goodwill/Indianapolis and the establishment of the rehabilitation facilities in Tashkent, determine the feasibility for expanding into new locations in the future.
5. Continue to hire and train those people with disabilities for the stores in Tashkent. Continue to develop the Tashkent database for disabled persons.

ACTION PLAN UNTIL JUNE 30, 1997

Continue with the present work plans for the Counterpart Consortium partners until USAID makes a decision on the possible extension of the project past June 30, 1997.

December 1996	Continue to develop training modules and technical assistance to the NGO community. Design possible program options for future USAID funding.
January- February 1997	Quarterly report submitted with projected activity for next quarter. Pipeline analysis and projections for next quarter. Most of the grant funds have been obligated
February - March 1997	USAID makes decision on the extension or phase-out.
April - June 1997	Either designing program for the extension with staffing commitments in various offices OR implementing a phase-out plan with both professional and support staff searching for new jobs.

OPTIONS FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE PROJECT

This project has only been operational for less than two years and all indications are that it is on track and has exceeded its targets in most of the areas. With one exception, the Consortium partners have performed as expected within the time frame of the project. The other partner is working with a newly created organization and has developed a Goodwill Partner who is officially registered and operating as a legal entity with a legal bank account. These procedures have taken much longer than originally expected and thus, that segment of the project design is behind schedule.

This project is well managed and has produced results within a very short time frame. However, without adequate NGO laws and policies that promote NGO development and their financial sustainability, this network of NGOs in the Central Asian Republics will likely be constrained. In most of the countries, NGO legislation is waiting to be enacted by the various governments. Within this framework, the various options for an extension seem to be as follows:

Option #1: Continue the project with increased support in various NGO sectors

Advantages:

1. Present investment would have a better chance of achieving long-term impact on achieving USAID's strategic objectives since many of the NGO Partnerships require stronger linkages to their U.S. partners which needs more time.
2. Trained staff is in place and working well in the regional offices and in Almaty and the continuation would preserve the investment in strengthening the leadership movement within indigenous NGOs.
3. The seed grant program would continue as a "mini-grant" option in strengthening the newly formed NGOs in all five countries including Turkmenistan.

Option #2: Continue the project with decreased financial support from USAID

Advantages:

1. Existing partnerships would be preserved between local and U.S. organizations.
2. Focussing on specific geographical areas would reduce the stress-level of trying to work in many countries with the present staff.

Disadvantages:

1. If present offices had to be closed, that investment might not reach its potential with the NGO support network that is presently being established.

Option #3 Close-out the project on schedule

Advantages:

1. Staff of Counterpart and the NGOs supported by the program would know ahead of time that the project is coming to an end. They would have time to find other support systems before the end of June.

Disadvantages:

1. The existing partnerships would be strained and some might not remain viable in the future.
2. Both local trained staff and expatriate staff would begin leaving the project for new jobs. This would affect the close-down phase and some activities would not be completed such as the monitoring of all the grantees and the impact assessment.
3. The project hasn't been operational long enough to measure direct impact on government policy and the delivery of social services.

Appendix A

Scope of Work

ARTICLE I - TITLE

Project No. 115-0001, Central Asian Republics

ARTICLE II - OBJECTIVE

A. Background: USAID/CAR is a regional Mission supporting USAID projects in five Central Asia Republics: Kazakhstan, Krygystan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Each country is on its own path towards democratic transition, and the work in different countries tries to be reflective of those differences, while supporting citizens rights region-wide. A variety of contractors work in the region in partnership with local NGOs. Counterpart Consortium is one among them. However, there are also housing associations, agricultural groups, NGOs supported through the American Law Center, health care workers, and environmental NGO groups.

B. SUMMARY: USAID Regional Mission for Central Asia would like to have a participatory evaluation done of the Counterpart Consortium Cooperative Agreement to focus program modifications for the final period of the Cooperative Agreement and to identify areas for follow-on work in support of the development of Non-Government Organizations in the region.

ARTICLE III - STATEMENT OF WORK

A. Activity to be Evaluated

The Non-governmental Organization (NGO) Support Activity was authorized with Cooperative Agreement No. 110-0007-G-00-4020-00 (later corrected to No. 110-0007-A-00-4020-00) between USAID and Counterpart Consortium on September 25, 1994. It is under the Civil Society Component of USAID's Democratic Pluralism Project. The program is planned to last until June, 1997 with a funding level of \$5 million. The objective of the program, as stated in the description of the Cooperative Agreement, is "to strengthen the capacity of indigenous NGOs in Central Asia."¹

Counterpart Consortium entered into sub-agreements with the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs, Aid-to-Artisans, and Goodwill International to carry out components of the work plan.

B. Purpose of the Evaluation

The primary purpose of the NGO Support Activity Evaluation is to assess the current status of the project, identify and analyze problems, and make recommendations for improving project implementation, and follow-on work as appropriate. The evaluation team will focus on assessing:

- 1) the validity of the program objectives in the context of the Mission's Strategic Objective in the areas of democracy and social services support for vulnerable populations;
- 2) the effectiveness of operational systems and management processes, including USAID inputs;
- 3) the modality of regional and country placement of staff to see if it makes the most effective use of USAID resources (ie, is it cost effective and also providing needed technical assistance);
- 4) the progress of program implementation;
- 5) the program's ability to self-evaluate, gain from lessons learned, and adapt implementation accordingly.

The team will identify problems and constraints to the successful achievement of the project purpose based upon its assessment, analyze the problems and constraints identified, formulate conclusions and recommend actions needed to improve project implementation and/or for design of other NGO development programs. Specifically, the team will undertake the work required to answer a series of questions as outlined in Section VI (Statement of Work).

C. Evolution of Programming Strategy and Civic Initiatives Program Design

Central Asian Democracies are in many ways less developed than those in Russia and Eastern Europe. This has enabled programs in the Central Asian Region to benefit from the experiences learned in those countries. The NGO Support Project was an outgrowth of that learning. It was designed to include three elements: grant programs, partnership programs, and the critical element of a training program to develop NGOs as sustainable institutions. To tie these together each Counterpart Grant evaluation considers the element of sustainability.

In developing this strategy the USAID mission for Central Asian Region (USAID/CAR) also sought to be sensitive to the variations in the needs of each country, within available budgets. This program was designed with a mixture of country and regional representatives.

D. Program Structure

Counterpart is the lead agency of a Consortium of four United States Private Voluntary Organizations (USPVOs). Counterpart is the direct recipient of money through a USAID Cooperative Agreement (#110-0007-G -00- 4020-00). As the lead agency, Counterpart manages and administers the program and the sub-agreements with the other participating organizations. It also oversees the subgrant program, with input from the sub-agreement partners.

The Consortium's training program works to alleviate a particular constraint of Central Asia's NGO sector through a series of training seminars, and through building an indigenous capacity through the Training of Trainers. The Consortium is also charged with overall management of the project. Finally, the Consortium oversees subgrants to indigenous NGOs which provide a wide array of advocacy and service programs.

The USPVO sub-agreements share a common goal, as stated in contract documents of providing "US models of service delivery and management in sectors vital to the community-based economic growth and maintenance of a social safety net for vulnerable groups in the population: unemployed, women, elderly, youth, people with disabilities and special needs." They do this through the development of intensive partnership relationships with indigenous groups.

While each of the sub-agreements lays out targets and goals, the Consortium also has developed a monitoring and evaluation plan for the Cooperative Agreement overall.

For Aid-to-Artisans the Purpose of the Sub-Agreement is: "To create financially sustainable NGOs in Central Asia through crafts-based micro enterprise."

For The Citizen's Network for Foreign Affairs the Sub-Agreement states that the purpose is: "To assist in the creation of democratic and pluralistic participation, promote the economic viability of rural communities and raise the quality of life for the people of rural Central Asia."

Goodwill International has a Program Purpose, as stated in the Sub-Agreement: "To transfer the Goodwill model of NGO and micro enterprise development,

vocational rehabilitation, and employment generation to Central Asia in order to improve the standard of living and quality of life of the most vulnerable groups within the population."

E. Statement of Work

As stated previously, the Evaluation Team will undertake the work required to assess the current status of the project, identify and analyze problems, and make recommendations for improving project implementation and for follow-on. The evaluation team will focus on answering these key questions:

- a. the validity of the program objectives in the context of the Mission's Strategic Objective in the areas of democracy and social services support for vulnerable populations;
- b. the effectiveness of operational systems and management processes, including USAID inputs;
- c. the modality of regional and country placement of staff to see if it makes the most effective use of USAID resources (ie, is it cost effective and also providing needed technical assistance);
- d. the progress of program implementation;
- e. the program's ability to self-evaluate, gain from lessons learned, and adapt implementation accordingly.

Below are some questions to be considered by the participatory evaluation team in analyzing the areas that are most critical to successful achievement of the results of the cooperative agreement. During the team planning meeting the best method for answering these and other questions should be considered. Based on this discussion, the evaluation methodology will be refined. At all phases of the evaluation, the Contractor/facilitator and the participating team should be aware of the goal of producing an action plan to improve program performance.

(1) Project Design

(a) Is a combined package of technical and grant-making assistance an effective approach?

(b) Has the Consortium model (Lead PVO and 3 sub-agreements) supported/inhibited the providers' ability to:

- (i) meet the needs of Central Asia's NGO support sector,
- (ii) administer and manage sub-grants,
- (iii) provide sound technical assistance in a timely manner,
- (iv) report/communicate with USAID,
- (v) cost-effective,
- (vi) develop sustainable NGOs or NGO support activities.

(c) Has the regional nature of the programs across five central Asian countries supported/inhibited the providers' ability to:

- (i) meet the needs of Central Asia's NGO support sector,
- (ii) administer and manage sub-grants,
- (iii) provide sound technical assistance in a timely manner,
- (iv) report/communicate with USAID,
- (v) be cost-effective,
- (vi) develop sustainable NGOs or NGO support activities.

(2) Project Objectives

(a) Have the NGO Support Initiative Activities's objectives been clearly laid out, agreed upon and/or accepted by all Consortium members? Do they meet USAID's current strategic objectives? If not, how should they be modified?

(b) Do the initial objectives laid out in the sub-agreements still conform to USAID's strategic objectives?

(c) Do the objectives of the individual Consortium units a) meet the developing needs of the Central Asian NGO sector, and b) support the overall objectives of the program?

(3) Operational systems and Management

(a) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the management of the NGO Support Initiative Activities Program by USAID, the lead agency, the regional centers, and the US linked sub-agreement partners, and all US based offices?

(b) Are USAID and the lead agency's reporting requirements (both programmatic and financial) effective in ensuring adequate information flow and identifying existing and potential problems in a timely manner, without overburdening the grantee and sub-grantees?

(c) Are the relationships, roles and responsibilities of USAID, the lead agency, the regional centers, and the US linked sub-agreement partners, and all US based offices clear vis-a-vis each other, clear to all Consortium members? How can these roles and relationships be improved upon to maximize program impact?

(d) Could the country offices implement a more effective NGO support program independent of the regional officers? What constraints might individual country programs face as independent entities? How could these constraints be overcome?

(e) Has USAID feedback/guidance been adequate and helpful to the grantee about 1) programming priorities, 2) budget considerations, and 3) observations from monitoring visits?

(f) Is timely, appropriate action to resolve implementation problems being taken by USAID, the lead agency, the regional centers, and the US linked sub-agreement partners, and the US-based home offices?

(g) Is the program missing opportunities to provide assistance as a result of cautious management?

(h) Has the Consortium successfully built upon successes and lessons learned of USAID and other NGO support programs in the NIS? If no, why not?

(i) Have the Consortium members worked successfully with other USAID projects? With other donor projects?

(4) Project Implementation

(a) Have the Consortium members been able to develop short-term and long-term implementation strategies? If not, why not? How has he

Consortium's planning effected the quality/quantity of the activities/outputs?

(b) Has the Consortium targeted a defined recipient audience? (Geographic, thematic, activity-type)? If so, is this recipient group consistent with implementing USAID's strategic objectives?

(c) Are the activities, seminars, grant programs, publications, information exchanges, etc, 1) meeting the needs of the NGO sector, and 2) supporting the objectives of the program, 3) supporting the objectives of USAID?

(d) Are the activities duplicative of other indigenous or donor efforts in Central Asia? Complimentary?

(e) Is the training program providing sufficient and appropriate technical assistance to NGOs in all five Central Asia countries, tailored to the differing needs of the countries?

(f) Are the regional offices providing sufficient information to the training office about specific needs of NGOs in their region?

(g) What is the present and potential impact of the program's training component? What thematic areas should the training component focus on? What are the advantages/disadvantages of using local versus other Central Asian versus Russian versus overseas trainers, which is most effective at meeting the objectives of this program?

(h) Is the Training-of-Trainers program effective, particularly in a) providing training to Central Asian NGOs, and 2) the post-grant sustainability of the local trainers and 3) the sustainability of a domestic training institution?

(i) What is the present and potential impact of the Consortium's grant program? Which type of grant (seed, partnership, challenge) is proving the most effective and has the most potential for meeting the objectives of the program?

(j) Should there be a stronger emphasis on legal and regulatory/policy framework? Are legal barriers inhibiting NGO sustainability?

(k) What should, if any be the social marketing component of the program? If there should be, what specific activities should the social marketing component undertake during the remainder of the program to have the greatest impact possible?

(l) Is two and a half years sufficient time to accomplish the objectives of the program and have some sort of sustainable impact on NGOs?

(5) Project Self-Evaluation

(a) Has the Consortium been able to evaluate its activities and impact on the NGO sector, recognized the lessons learned, and adapted implementation accordingly?

(b) Is the amount of time and energy spent on self-evaluation (not reporting) detracting from their ability to implement activities?

(6) Sustainability

(a) What components of the program can reasonably become sustainable (re: survive beyond the life of the cooperative agreement, without continued USAID and/or foreign donor funding)? What attributes have made these particular components more likely to sustain themselves?

(b) What components of the program are most and least valuable in contributing to the development of sustainable Central Asian NGOs?

F. Methodology

As we are seeking a participatory evaluation, the details of the work plan will need to be developed between the contracted evaluation team, USAID, and the members of the Counterpart Consortium; this shall constitute the participating team. It is anticipated that the principle methods to be employed in the conduct of this evaluation are: (1) review of the Cooperative agreement contract and monitoring documents (see below); (2) interviews, briefings, and group discussion; (3) input from evaluations of other NGO projects in the CAR, if available. It is anticipated that rapid appraisal techniques, rather than formal sample surveys will be utilized.

Prior to commencing on-site review, the Contractor shall:

- (1) Review background documents, including but not limited to:
 - . Strategic Framework documents for SO 2.1 and SO 3.2 for USAID/CAR
 - . Cooperative Agreement with Counterpart, including Amendments
 - . Subagreements with CNFA, ATA, and Goodwill
 - . Monthly, Quarterly and any special Reports of Counterpart Consortium
 - . Pipeline Analysis of Counterpart Consortium
- (2) Conduct interviews and hold briefings with:
 - . Relevant USAID/ENI/DG staff
 - . Counterpart Washington-based Consortium Project Director and other relevant Consortium staff
- (3) In addition to the above, the Team Leader will contact the Chief, Office of Social Transition, USAID/Almaty for additional advice on U.S. interviews as well as advice and recommendations on host country sources and to arrange preliminary appointments. This may be the opportunity to arrange for the in-country team planning meeting.

ENI/DG, USAID/Washington, Christine Sheckler will obtain country clearances for the team and will schedule USAID Washington meetings. Attachment 1 of this document provides a prioritized listing of contacts, in Washington and the field. In the course of conducting the evaluation, the field missions and the Contractor may add to this list.

Upon arrival in Almaty, Kazakstan, the Evaluation team will brief the Director, Office of Social Transition, USAID/Almaty. On arrival in Uzbekistan, the Evaluation team will brief the USAID Representative and will present a summary of preliminary findings prior to departure.

The field work will start with assembling the participating team to reach a common understanding of the work plan, develop a list of critical discussions to be able to answer the key questions as outlined in this scope of work, and to develop an understanding of responsibilities.

During the field work, the Contractor shall conduct site visits to field program review in Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; including but not limited to meetings with USAID field mission staff, U.S. Embassy personnel, Consortium representatives, host country program counterparts, training program participants. In the course of this field evaluation effort, it is expected that the Contractor will employ the full range of methodological techniques listed above; i.e. document review, interviews, group discussion and briefings with other NGO support programs in the region.

The final work plan developed by the participating team may include a second meeting in Almaty for a mid-way meeting prior to the field work on developing the preliminary report.

On completion of the field work, but prior to return to the U.S. the team will prepare and present a preliminary draft of the Evaluation to the Director, Office of Social Transition. The first work day of the teams return to Washington, a copy of the preliminary draft presented to USAID Almaty will also be made available to ENI/DG. The Contracting Team Leader will be responsible for the preparation of the final report.

ARTICLE IV - REPORTS AND OTHER DELIVERABLES

1. Once the data are gathered, the facilitator will need to negotiate among stakeholders to reach understanding of the answers to the key questions. The Contractor will be responsible for producing the final report. The final report should include data, findings, recommendations, and preparation of an action plan to improve program performance.
2. One week prior to departure for Central Asia, the Contractor will submit a draft work plan to USAID/CAR for concurrence. This draft work plan will include proposed report indicators to be tested in the field, and a schedule of minimum planned interviews in each country.
3. A preliminary report is to be presented to USAID/CAR/Almaty prior to departure from the field.
4. Immediately following return from the field, the Evaluation Team will orally debrief the evaluation findings to USAID staff. A copy of this preliminary report will also be presented to ENI/DG upon return to the U.S.
5. Within 14 days of receiving USAID/CAR and USAID/Washington comments on the preliminary report, the Contractor will submit 5 copies of a second draft report for USAID's and Counterpart's review.
6. AID's and Counterpart's comments will be given to the Contractor within approximately three weeks following receipt of the second draft report. Within ten days, the Contractor will prepare and submit a final report that responds to AID's and Counterpart's comments. Twenty copies (19 bound and one loose leaf) of the final report will be submitted by the Contractor to AID for distribution. The final report will be presented in hard copy and on a diskette in WordPerfect 5.1 format. The final report is not to exceed 30 pages, plus an Executive Summary of findings and conclusions not to exceed 5 pages. Additional material may be submitted in Annexes, as appropriate; e.g. bibliography of documents analyzed, list of persons and agencies interviewed, list of participants in focus groups, etc.
7. Based on the results from the completed evaluation and all other

pertinent data, the Contractor will prepare a Project Evaluation Summary in USAID's standard format ENI/DG/PSPM will provide the Contractor a disk of the WordPerfect macro for this format. The summary will include action decisions approved, evaluation abstract, purpose of activity, purpose of evaluation and methodology used, findings and conclusions, and recommendations. This summary will be submitted at the time of the final report submission and will be presented in both hard copy and on a diskette.

ARTICLE V - TECHNICAL DIRECTIONS

Technical Directions during the performance of this order will be provided by the USAID/CAR Strategic Objective Team Member pursuant to Section F.9. of the contract. (See Block 5 of the Cover Sheet)

ARTICLE VI - TERM OF PERFORMANCE

The evaluation will start approximately two weeks from the award of the contract, depending on the availability of consultants, the availability of the representatives of the organizations and government institutions involved, and the scheduling needs of the field Missions. The entire assignment is estimated to take approximately one and a half months of work over a three month period. This estimate assumes two weeks for USAID review of the first draft, and two weeks for USAID and Counterpart review of the draft final report. Implicit in this estimate is the Contractor's ability to guarantee availability of the Team Leader to respond/incorporate USAID comments/suggestions on evolving drafts.

A. The effective date of this delivery order is September 30, 1996 and the estimated completion date is December 30, 1996.

B. Subject to the ceiling price established in this delivery order and with prior written approval of the Project Manager (see Block No. 5 on the Cover Page), contractor is authorized to extend the estimated completion date, provided that such extension does not cause the elapsed time for completion of the work, including the furnishing of all deliverables, to extend beyond 30 calendar days from the original estimated completion date. The contractor shall attach a copy of the Project Manager's approval for any extension of the term of this delivery order to the final voucher submitted for payment.

C. It is the contractor's responsibility to ensure that the Project Manager-approved adjustments to the original estimated completion date do not result in costs incurred which exceed the ceiling price of this delivery order. Under no circumstances shall such adjustments authorize the contractor to be paid any sum in excess of the delivery order.

D. Adjustments which will cause the elapsed time for completion of the work to exceed the original estimated completion date by more than 30 calendar days must be approved in advance by the Contracting Officer.

ARTICLE VII - WORK DAYS ORDERED

A.	Functional Labor Category & Specialist	Work Days Ordered	Burdened Fixed Daily Rate	Total
	Senior Social Scientist (Hubin) SCHUMACHER	28.5	683.65	19,485
	Senior Social Scientist (Goodin)	1.5	683.65	1,025

B. The individuals identified above are designated as essential/key personnel pursuant to Section F.11. of the contract.

C. Subject to the ceiling price established in this delivery order and the prior written approval of the Project Manager, the contractor is authorized to adjust the number of work days actually employed in the performance of the work by each position specified in this order. The contractor shall attach a copy of the Project Manager's approval to the final voucher submitted for payment.

D. It is the contractor's responsibility to ensure that the Project Manager-approved adjustments to the work days ordered for each functional labor specialist do not result in costs incurred which exceed the ceiling price of this delivery order. Under no circumstances shall such adjustments authorize the contractor to be paid any sum in excess of the ceiling price.

ARTICLE VIII - CEILING PRICE

For Work-Days Ordered	\$ 20,510
For Other Direct Cost	<u>\$ 10,090</u>
Ceiling Price	\$ 30,600

The contractor will not be paid any sum in excess of the ceiling price.

ARTICLE IX - USE OF GOVERNMENT FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL

The contractor, and its employees or consultants are prohibited from using U.S. Government facilities (such as office space or equipment), or U.S. Government clerical or technical personnel in the performance of the services specified in the delivery order, unless the use of Government facilities or personnel is specifically authorized in the order, or is authorized in advance, by the Contracting Officer.

ARTICLE X - DUTY POST

The Duty Posts for this delivery order are Almaty, Kazakstan, and Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

ARTICLE XI - LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS

The contractor's personnel shall have English language capability at the S-4, R-4 level.

ARTICLE XII - ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

The contractor will not have access to classified information.

ARTICLE XIII - LOGISTIC SUPPORT

All logistical support will be provided by the Contractor, including travel, transportation, secretarial and office support, interpretation services, report printing, and communications as appropriate. Depending upon availability, space for the evaluation team members to work may be at the USAID/CAR offices, the Counterpart offices, or may need to be provided by the Contractor.

ARTICLE XIV - WORK WEEK

The contractor is authorized up to a 6-day work week with no premium pay.

ARTICLE XV - EMERGENCY LOCATOR INFORMATION

The Contractor agrees to provide the following information to the Mission Administrative Officer on or before the arrival in a Cooperating Country of every contract employee or dependent:

1. The individual's full name, home address, and telephone number.
2. The name and number of the contract, and whether the individual is an employee or dependent.
3. The Contractor's name, home office address, and telephone number, including any after-hours emergency number(s), and the name of the Contractor's home office staff member having administrative responsibility for the contract.
4. The name, address, and telephone number(s) of each individual's next of kin.
5. Any special instructions pertaining to emergency situations such as power of attorney designees or alternate contact persons.

ARTICLE XVI - ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST/PROCUREMENT INTEGRITY

A. Nothing in this delivery order or contract is intended to create a situation in which the Contractor, its employees or consultants not directly associated with performance of this delivery order or contract, or the personnel performing hereunder (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Contractor") will have an organizational conflict of interest, i.e., where the Contractor is unable or potentially unable to render impartial assistance or advice to A.I.D., or the objectivity of the Contractor is or might be otherwise impaired, or the Contractor gains an unfair competitive advantage. This applies both to this delivery order or contract, as well as any acquisition (contracts) or assistance (grants and cooperative agreements) instruments to be awarded under the project or program being planned, designed, or developed hereunder.

B. Similarly, nothing in this delivery order or contract is intended to create a situation in which the Contractor serves as a Procurement Official (as defined in FAR 3.104-4[h]) for any acquisition or assistance instruments to be awarded under the project or program being planned, designed, or developed hereunder; nor is the Contractor authorized to have access to proprietary or source selection information (as defined in FAR 3.104-4[j] and [k]; A.I.D. [M/AAA/SER and GC] General Notice issued June 7, 1989 and effective July 16, 1989, subject: Improper Disclosure of Acquisition Information; and A.I.D. [AA/M and GC] General Notice effective July 16, 1989, subject: Procurement Integrity-Source Selection Information) for any acquisition or assistance instruments to be awarded under the project or program being planned, designed, or developed hereunder.

C. Nevertheless, if either the Contracting Officer for this delivery order or contract, or the Contracting/Grant/Agreement Officer for any acquisition or assistance instruments to be awarded under the project or program being planned, designed, or developed hereunder, subsequently determine that organizational conflicts of interest exist, appropriate action, as described in FAR 9.5, may be taken to avoid, neutralize, or mitigate such organizational conflicts of interest.

D. Similarly, if it is subsequently determined that the Contractor in fact

served as a Procurement Official or had access to proprietary or source selection information for those acquisition or assistance instruments, appropriation action may be taken to preclude the Contractor from becoming a competing contractor (as defined in FAR 3.104-4[b]) or (sub)contractor for those acquisition or assistance instruments, and/or to effect the remedies described in FAR 3.104-11(d) for violations of the Procurement Integrity legislation (41 U.S.C. 423, as amended).

E. Any personnel performing under this delivery order or contract who subsequently become a marketing consultant (as defined in FAR 9.501) for any acquisition or assistance instruments to be awarded under the project or program being planned, designed, or developed hereunder will be required to report their activities as a marketing consultant pursuant to FAR 52.209-7.

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ATTACHMENT 1

Contacts:

Washington
USAID/ENI/DG
Christine Sheckler
Mitch Henderson

Counterpart/W
Arlene Lear
Joel Levin

USAID/CAR
Marilynn Schmidt, Director, Office of Social Transition, COTR Counterpart Consortium, USAID/Almaty
Kai Nissley, Senior Advisor, Activity Manager Counterpart Consortium Strategic Objective Team 2.1, USAID/Almaty
David Mandel, Regional Representative, Tashkent
Richard Fraenkl, Regional Representative, Dushanbe
CJ Rushin-Bell, Regional Representative, Bishkek

Counterpart/Almaty
Len Klein, Chief of Party
Anwar Samad, Chief accountant

Counterpart/Bishkek
Jay Cooper, Country Director, Regional Training Coordinator

Counterpart/Dushanbe
Renny Smith, Country Director

Counterpart/Tashkent
Melanie Reimer, Country Director

Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs
Tom Carmody

Aid-to-Artisans
Karla Hostetler

Goodwill Enterprises
Melissa Brill

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Appendix B

Individuals and Organizations Contacted

CENTRAL ASIA NGO SUPPORT INITIATIVE

LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS and INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

Counterpart Consortium

Counterpart Foundation Inc., Washington D.C.(Arlene Lear, Joel Levin) , Almaty (Leonard Klein, Anwar Samad, Blair Sheridan,), Tashkent (Melanie Reimer, Lakesha Lindsey), Bishkek (Jay Cooper), Dushanbe (Renny Smith)
Interns and trainers at Almaty, Bishkek and Tashkent

Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs, Washington D.C.(William Witting, Martin Tillman), Bishkek (Thomas Carmody), Staff in Bishkek

Aid to Artisans, Farmington, CT (Glenn McGrory and Tamara Jarvis), Tashkent (Karla Hostetler), and in Buhkara (Gay Ellis)

Goodwill Industries International, Bethesda (Elizabeth Scott, Melissa Jordan), Tashkent (Melissa Brill)

USAID REPRESENTATIVES IN CENTRAL ASIA & Washington D.C.

Marilynn Schmidt, Almaty (Director, Office of Social Transition)
Kai Nissley, Almaty (Senior Advisor, Activity Manager Counterpart Consortium)
David Mandel, Tashkent (Country Representative)
C.J. Rushin-Bell, Bishkek (Country Representative)
Richard Fraenkel, Dushanbe (Country Representative)
Douglas Kent, Bishkek (First Secretary, Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy)
Christine Sheckler, Washington, D.C.(ENI/DG Senior Advisor to Central Asia NGO Support Initiative)

NGOs IN CENTRAL ASIA

Kazakstan

Special Olympics of Kazakstan
Bureau of NGO Technical support
Green Salvation
Women's League of Creative Initiative
Mayir Centre for Psychological Support for Teenagers

Kyrgyzstan

International Center InterBilim
Kyrgyz Children's Fund
Alga Forum of Women's NGOs
Junior Achievement

Kyrgyz Peace Research Center
Society of Young Teachers
Aikyn Consumers' Rights Protection Agency
Osh Oblast Union of Private Farmers Associations

Other Organizations:

UNHCR (Helmut Buss)
GTZ and Agriculture and Food Consultants International (AFC)
(Monica Sieg)

Uzbekistan

Artisan's Center in Bukhara
Samarkand Association of Handicrafts, Handicraft Development Centre
AVICENNA (Association of Children Doctors of Bukhara District)
Goodwill Initiativa (Bekhzod R. Vakubov, Director)
Goodwill Initiativa (Bakhadir, Executive Director of Board)
Russian Cultural Centre, Children Rights in Chirchik
Business Women's Association of Uzbekistan
Tashkent Agency of Social and Market Research
KRIDI (Parents' Club of Disabled Children in Tashkent)
Center for Public Education
Women's Resource Center, Women's Rights
Tashkent Public Education Center
Association of Accountants and Auditors

Other Organizations:

The Eurasia Foundation
Uzbek-American Alumni Center (ACCELS and AED)
Aid To Artisans (Gay Ellis, Consultant)

Appendix C

Documents Consulted

Documents Consulted

Counterpart Foundation, Inc., "The COUNTERPART Consortium: NGO Support Initiative for Central Asia: Technical Proposal, Cost Proposal, Attachment 1(Implementation Plans for Consortium Members), Attachment 2 (Consortium PVOs' Letters of Intent, Subcontractors Letters of Intent), Attachment 3 (Counterpart Experience Designing & Conducting Training Workshops and Seminars with Indigenous NGOs), Attachment 4 (NGO Survey Data for Kazakhstan & Kyrgyzstan & US PVO/NIS NGO Linkages and Partnerships Resulting from VEST Trips), Attachment 5 (Goodwill Curriculum for International Internship Training Program), " submitted to USAID (August 8, 1994).

Counterpart Foundation, Inc., "Subagreements Between AID TO ARTISANS, THE CITIZENS NETWORK FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and GOODWILL INDUSTRIES, INTERNATIONAL" (August 1994).

Counterpart Foundation, Inc., "The Counterpart Consortium NGO Support Initiative for Central Asia: Status Report on Mobilization and Start-Up Phase: October 1, 1994 to December 31, 1994" (January 1995)

Counterpart Foundation, Inc., "The Counterpart Consortium NGO Support Initiative for Central Asia: Quarterly Reports: January - March 1995, April - June, 1995, July - September, 1995, October - December 1995, January - March 1996, April - June 1996, July - September 1996.

Counterpart Foundation, Inc., "Counterpart Consortium Monthly Reports: January 1995 through August 1996.

Counterpart Foundation, Inc., "Monitoring and Evaluation Plan: Practical Approaches for Results Management: The Counterpart Consortium NGO Support Initiative for Central Asia" (August 3, 1995)

Counterpart Foundation, Inc., "Counterpart Consortium NGO Support Initiative Training Plan for Central Asia", (June 1995)

Counterpart Consortium, "Seed Grant Management Package: Grant Process and Procedures", (1995)

Counterpart Consortium, "NGOs Database", Bishkek (1996)

Counterpart Consortium, "Briefing Paper: NGO Development in Uzbekistan", Tashkent (1996)

The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Profiles: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan", (1995-96)

Starr, S. Frederick, "Making Eurasia Stable", Foreign Affairs, January/February 1996

USAID, NIS Regional Contracts Office, "Cooperative Agreement Number 110-0007-A-00-4020-00 and Amendments to Cooperative Agreement: No. 1 through 7", (September 28, 1994).

USAID Regional Mission for Central Asia, "Kazakstan: Results Review and Resource Request (R4)", (April 1996)